When there is no turning back, then
we should concern ourselves only with the best way of going forward.
The
Quest for Community: A Study in the Ethics of Order and Freedom, by Robert
Nisbet
In an industrial and mobile age, of what relevance is the
understanding that “community” (family, kin, tribe, church) plays a
foundational role in maintaining a relatively libertarian order? It is a question I often ask myself; it is a
question that will begin to be explored in this post.
There was a time when life was not possible outside of these
traditional community institutions; this is no longer the case. Today the individual is set almost absolutely
free from reliance on family and church.
Absent these functional roles, is it reasonable to expect that such
institutions are capable of playing a culturally binding role?
The problem is moral, intellectual, social and political –
in an environment drastically different than the traditional. The solution will not be found in a longing
for the past:
[The solution is in no way] compatible
with antiquarian revivals of groups and values no longer in accord with the
requirements of the industrial and democratic age in which we live and to which
we are unalterably committed.
I am reminded of something from chapter 15 of Rothbard’s For
A New Liberty:
The clock cannot be turned back to
a preindustrial age….We are stuck with the industrial age, whether we like it
or not.
Yet I am offered a conflict, as Rothbard continues:
But if that is true, then the cause
of liberty is secured. For economic
science has shown, as we have partially demonstrated in this book, that only
freedom and a free market can run an industrial economy. In short…in an industrial world it is also a
vital necessity. For, as Ludwig von
Mises and other economists have shown, in an industrial economy statism simply
does not work.
Liberty, it seems to me, cannot be secured strictly on a foundation
of industrialization. We see – both in our
age and Nisbet’s work – that it is that same industrial age that has helped to reduce
the influence played by the institutions that traditionally afforded man
liberty.
Returning to Nisbet:
Historically, our problem must be
seen in terms of the decline in functional and psychological significance of
such groups as the family, the small local community, and the various other
traditional relationships that have immemorially mediated between the
individual and his society.
Such groups played a perceptible difference in the
maintenance of life. Such groups play
little if any functional or psychological role today. Absent playing such roles, on what basis
would these groups then have standing to play their traditional mediating role? We see today that they have no standing.
Our present crisis lies in the fact
that whereas the small traditional associations, founded on kinship, faith, or
locality, are still expected to communicate to individuals the principle moral
ends and psychological gratifications of society, they have manifestly become
detached from positions of functional relevance to the larger economic and
political decisions of our society.
Mutual aid, welfare, education, recreation, economic
production – no longer are these provided by “small traditional associations.” Without this functional and psychological
role, it cannot be expected that these associations can play their mediating
(decentralizing) role. The reasons for
an individual’s allegiance to these associations are absent.
But is this to be blamed solely on the industrialization and
mobility of our age? Nisbet offers an
examination of the impact of humanitarian reforms brought to economically
underdeveloped regions, yet his words ring true even for the most advanced
economies:
Some of the most extreme instances
of insecurity and conflict of values in native cultures have resulted not from
the nakedly ruthless forces of economic exploitation but from the most
commendable (by Western standards) acts of humanitarian reform.
We see this even in the West. Government has taken on the role
traditionally played by family, community, church. Government has subsidized local-community-destroying
behavior, resulting in ever-increasing local-community-destroying
behavior. The examples are not limited
to the undeveloped world, as Nisbet offers:
What is to be observed so vividly
in many areas of the East is also, and has been, for some time, a notable characteristic
of Western society.
Physically (and virtually), man is in many ways less
isolated than ever; yet he is more isolated than ever from any “sense of meaningful
proximity to the major ends and purposes of his culture.” No amount of material welfare will replace
man’s need for meaningful community.
Conclusion
…irrespective of particular groups,
there must be in any stable culture, in any civilization that prizes its
integrity, functionally significant and psychologically meaningful groups and
associations lying intermediate to the individual and larger values and
purposes of his society.
Today, there is no intermediation; instead we have
governmental agencies, large industrial concerns, unions and large
charities. And football.
The solution will not be found in a longing for the old, but
in recognition of the new: where authority and function was found in
traditional community, it has now been fully incorporated into the modern
state.
Epilogue
I cannot help but see in this a theme that we have visited
often: liberty will be found in political decentralization – the all-encompassing
role of the modern state must be destroyed.
But this decentralization isn’t just for the benefit of
giving us each more choice regarding the type of society in which we choose to
live. There seems to be a mutually
reinforcing relationship: political decentralization will return authority and
functionality to evermore local institutions, returning meaning to
relationships and allowing governance to form in a more voluntary manner, via
intermediating institutions.
Does not the whole concept of ‘liberty’ only arise in response to the presence of political rule ? It is the existence of the state which provokes the question of liberty. Absent political control one has no need to speak of liberty. This is why Rothbard’s fundamental project has always been to swap political control for consumer control. In Rothbard’s scheme all services, particularly the provisioning of security and justice, are under direct consumer control. At present we exist in a hybrid of transnational corporation and regional political power centers. In the ultimate realization of Rothbard’s scheme political power must completely give way to integrated layers of privately produced security and justice - administered by insurance companies - themselves governed by consumer’s willingness to purchase policies from them.
ReplyDeleteAt this juncture the concern for the question of liberty disappears, replaced by the question of living the life of cultivated leisure. The artist plays the fundamental role in such future society. Different artists offer different visions for the sort of mood and mode the cultivated life should entail. It is just this yet unrealized society of cultivated leisure, and not the pursuit of liberty, toward which Rothbard’s philosophy finally tends.
The goal then is to swap out the utilitarian economic society of past and present for the future society of cultivated leisure. We can only imagine the sort of wondrous relations such a society might bestow. What is clear is that they will be of a far finer type, existing in a much nobler and more pleasant atmosphere, than the brutish, oppressive, and insufferably dull relations we know today.
"Some of the most extreme instances of insecurity and conflict of values in native cultures have resulted not from the nakedly ruthless forces of economic exploitation but from the most commendable (by Western standards) acts of humanitarian reform." - Nisbet
ReplyDeleteThis quote you've selected above fits nicely with Ayn Rand's mentor Isabel Paterson when she said:
"Most of the harm in the world is done by good people, and not by accident, lapse, or omission. It is the result of their deliberate actions, long persevered in, which they hold to be motivated by high ideals toward virtuous ends."
and further:
"Perhaps then he is to do only what is actually "good" for others. But will those others know what is good for them? No, that is ruled out by the same difficulty. Then shall A do what he thinks is good for B, and B do what he thinks is good for A? Or shall A accept only what he thinks is good for B, and vice versa? But that is absurd. Of course what the humanitarian actually proposes is that he shall do what he thinks is good for everybody. It is at this point that the humanitarian sets up the guillotine."
https://mises.org/library/humanitarian-guillotine
and C.S. Lewis when he said:
"Of all tyrannies, a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims may be the most oppressive. It would be better to live under robber barons than under omnipotent moral busybodies. The robber baron's cruelty may sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who torment us for our own good will torment us without end for they do so with the approval of their own conscience."
Maybe these planners, progressives, or democratic socialist apologists of state power didn't mean to be tyrannical. Maybe they were just operating under the "approval of their conscience" (or the devil's). I just find that hard to believe.
This humanitarian with the guillotine, which often takes the form of a state usurping the traditional roles of family and community as you've noted above has consequences in the economic realm as well. And it brings up a question I've had concerning the nature of giving. Is giving only 'good' when done on a small interpersonal communal level?
ReplyDeleteIt seems to me that when it is done on a grand scale as a measure of state policy, whether it is foreign aid or domestic welfare transfers, it often has 'bad' effects. In regards to foreign aid, the giving tends to destroy local economies and therefore a community's ability to sustain itself. In regards to domestic welfare, a similar situation begins occurring: whole generations become entombed in poverty, poor work ethic, and criminal behavior.
I think it also has undesirable effects when the US exports state subsidized farm products to developing nations at prices which the local growers cannot compete with, thereby destroying local economies.
However, when a foreign nation (say China) begins exporting produced goods to a developed economy (say the US) for less cost than is feasible domestically, I think this is a good thing for both China and the US. US workers are freed up to produce value in some other field of work, US consumers get to enjoy more affordable goods, and the living standards of Chinese producers and workers go up. Clearly there is some pain to be had when domestic workers are freed up to find employment in another industry, but overall, I think the effect is positive. Without cheap stuff produced abroad, Americans would really be feeling the effects of inflation. On the other hand, from a strategic perspective, maybe it's a bad thing that we aren't.
It seems like there is a line demarcating when giving free or trading cheap stuff to another country has good effects and when it has bad effects. Maybe the Catholic principle of subsidiarity has merit in the realm of economics too?