Wilhelm Röpke was not the most
technically competent free market economist of our time, but he was the most
accurate one. He was the one economist in the free market tradition who has
forthrightly acknowledged that social theory is broader than economic theory.
Economics is a subset of social theory, not the other way around. Röpke spent a
great deal of time thinking about the moral foundations of the modern social
order.
The issue being addressed is economic, the division of labor
society:
This is not a technical issue; it
is a moral issue. The division of labor did not increase in the West apart from
the West's social and moral order.
North’s piece is focused on the moral and legal framework
that makes the division of labor possible.
I intend to move in a slightly different direction.
North cites Röpke; the subject work is Röpke’s
International
Economic Disintegration.
Röpke wrote
the book in the late 1930s, published in 1942.
I will focus on Chapter V, beginning page 67 in the embedded PDF:
THE problem to be discussed here is
deemed so important, that it should be used as the starting point of any causal
analysis of the present disintegration of world economy worthy of the name.
In reading both North and Röpke, it seems to me the
discussion could also be applied to the social order much more broadly defined. Chapter V is entitled “THE IMPORTANCE OF THE
EXTRA-ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK FOR THE WORKING OF THE ECONOMIC PROCESS.” I will propose considering it in the
following context:
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EXTRA-POLITICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE WORKING OF THE LIBERTARIAN PROCESS
As has been remarked earlier, no
one will seriously dispute that this traditional spirit of economic science
was, and still is, largely coloured by belief in not only the sociological
autonomy, but also the sociologically regulating influence of the market
economy.
Röpke suggests that a robust market economy cannot survive
or thrive absent a framework that is found outside of pure economic science – a
market economy cannot function in just any social environment. One might consider: can the NAP properly
function autonomously, without consideration of the broader social framework?
If the answer is yes, then anything goes – the libertines
and the dreamers are right. If the
answer is no, one might decide to take Hoppe more seriously when considering
the NAP.
Implicitly and explicitly, it was
and still is held that a market economy based on competition and essentially
unhampered by any agency outside the competitive market is an ordre naturel which, once freed from all
impediments, is able to stand indefinitely on its own feet…
Thus the competitive market
appeared to be a "philosopher's stone," which turned the base metal
of callous business sentiments into the pure gold of common welfare and solidarity…
With government (as we know it today) out of the way, is it
reasonable to expect that a libertarian order would blossom out of the remains –
without any other changes or requirements?
Could the libertarian order stand “on its own feet”…“once freed from all
impediments”?
If yes, score one for the libertines and dreamers; if no,
Hoppe gets a shout.
So far the competitive market
economy was considered sociologically autonomous: it needed no special laws, no
special state or special society, required neither a special morality nor any
other irrational and extra-economic forces and sentiments.
Can a libertarian society survive and thrive under any
conditions, without a “special society” or a “special morality” or any other “forces
and sentiments” outside of the NAP? If
it can, the libertines and dreamers are correct. If it cannot…well, you know.
Rarely or never was this belief
stated so crudely, but surely few will to-day deny that the general tendency of
the liberal philosophy ran—and in some quarters still runs—in this direction.
This is also the general tendency of those who believe a
libertarian society can survive and thrive under any social or moral
framework. Maybe they are right, maybe
not.
Far from consuming and being
dependent on socio-political integration from outside the economic sphere, the competitive
market economy produces it—or so runs the argument.
Does the NAP produce
an orderly society, or are certain conditions within society necessary pre-conditions for the NAP? As to economics, Röpke suggests that certain
conditions are necessary pre-conditions:
If views like these were ever held
at all, it has become obviously impossible to continue to hold them to-day. …we
are forced emphatically to deny that this order is anything like an ordre naturel independent of the extra-economic
framework of moral, political, legal and institutional conditions…
The world around us tells us that achieving a society
grounded in the NAP is far more difficult and far more complicated than
achieving a relatively sophisticated division-of-labor economy. To open one’s eyes is to see this
reality. If extra-economic moral and
institutional conditions are necessary for the proper functioning of the
relatively simple division-of-labor economy, how much more true must it be for
achieving a society that respects the non-aggression principle?
…it is highly doubtful…that
economic integration can be sufficiently relied upon to produce automatically
the degree of socio-political integration it requires.
The chicken or the egg?
Does this question apply also to consideration of the NAP in a broader
social context?
Röpke offers his view:
…it would be a great mistake to
think that that would make the market system an ethically neutral sphere. On
the contrary, it is a highly sensitive artefact of occidental civilization,
with all the latter's ingredients of Christian and pre-Christian morality and
its secularized forms…
Before jumping on me or Röpke, note that he includes “its
secularized forms.”
Conclusion
It is difficult to imagine how the
leading thinkers of former generations could have been more or less blind to
this fundamental truth, which seems so obvious and even trivial to us to-day.
Are Röpke’s thoughts regarding the division-of-labor economy
equally applicable to the libertarian political order and to some of the “leading
[and not-so-leading] thinkers” of this school?
I just wonder….