1)
1939
a.
January
i. French
Ambassador in Berlin, André François-Poncet: “Hitler suggests that they install
an extraterritorial throughway with an auto highway and railway line through
the Corridor, so that East Prussia has a direct connection with the Reich. Beck had stated that such a solution appeared
acceptable to him.” (1:513)
b.
4 January
i. Roosevelt
has the US fleet from the Pacific pass through the Panama Canal to the Atlantic
side for maneuvers in the Caribbean. On
the same day, he requests $1.3 billion for arms production and asks Congress to
repeal or relax the US neutrality laws (this latter being refused). (1:524)
c.
5 January
i. Poland’s
Foreign Minister Beck visits Hitler in the Alpine residence near Salzburg. Hitler, still hoping that his agreement
regarding Teschen would result in some gratitude, offers again to concede all
lost territories to Poland in exchange for Danzig and extra-territorial transit
rights, with some further clarification: “Danzig comes politically to the
German community and remains economically with Poland.” Beck doesn’t budge, but offers to consider
further solutions. The peace is not
lost. (1:490)
d.
7 January
i. Joseph
Grew, lifelong friend of Roosevelt and ambassador to Japan, writes that
economic sanctions would not work “unless the United States is prepared to
resort to the ultimate measure of force.” (10:191)
e.
11 January
i. The
People’s Commissariat of Defense Industry is disbanded; it is replaced with
four new commissions: shipbuilding, weapons, aviation, and ammunition. (2:127)
f.
12 January
i. Report to the Polish Foreign Office by the
Polish Ambassador at Washington, Count Jerzy Potocki
1.
“Public opinion in America nowadays expresses
itself in an increasing hatred of everything . . . connected with National
Socialism. Above all, propaganda here is entirely in Jewish hands . . . It is
interesting to observe that this carefully thought-out campaign -- which is
primarily conducted against National Socialism -- no reference at all is made
to Soviet Russia.”
g.
19 January
i. Henry
Stimson, having recently joined the American Committee for Non-Participation in
Japanese Aggression, is reported in the New
York Times, headlined “Group to Ask Curb on Aid to Japan; Stimson Heads
Committee That Will Fight American Sales of Iron, Steel, and Oil.” (10:188)
h.
25 January
i. German
Foreign Minister visits Warsaw – a third attempt on the German side to resolve
Danzig. Once again, there is no
progress, but also the door is not closed: “…agreement that both the present
and the future issues that concern jointly both states should be examined and
resolved, with protection of the legitimate interests of both nations.” (1:490)
i.
26 January
i. French
Foreign Minister Bonnet gives a speech on the broad outlines of his foreign
policy before the National Assembly in Paris: “In the event of war, …if England
and France should be drawn into it, all the forces of Great Britain are
available to France as all the forces of France are to Great Britain…. Regarding the relations with Poland, it
suffices to recall that the Polish Foreign Minister Beck has declared that the
Polish-French friendship invariably represents one of the foundations of Polish
politics.” At the same session, Prime Minister Daladier says “That it is
fitting to oppose a categorical no to the demands of some neighbors.” This is before Hitler occupies the remainder
of Czechia. (1:491)
j.
February
i. The
Polish General Staff work out guidelines for the operations of their armed
forces in a war against Germany. (1:492)
ii. Roosevelt
undermines the ongoing German-British negotiations on a trade agreement through
his own offer of a trade treaty [with Britain] which excludes a German-British
Treaty. (1:525)
k.
March
i. Polish
newspapers in West Prussia-Pomeralia call for a boycott of Germans: shops,
market stalls, restaurants, hiring, etc. (1:555)
l.
4 March
i. Polish
military begins work on “Plan Operacyny Zachud” (Operation Plan West), one
month before Hitler orders the Wehrmacht to work on “Case White.” (1:492)
m.
10 March
i. At
the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party, it is declared that Great
Britain wants to trigger a war between the Germans and the Soviet Union – while
Britain remained on the sideline. (2:233)
n.
16 March
i. Hitler
marches troops into the rest of disintegrating Czechoslovakia. (1:492)
ii. This
action perhaps spoiled his chances of bringing Danzing through diplomatic
means, as Hitler went beyond his previous agreement with Britain. (1:523)
iii. France’s
Foreign Minister Bonnet proposes French-Soviet deliberations to the Soviet
Ambassador in Paris regarding possible joint action against Germany in case the
Germans take new action toward another East European country. (1:539)
iv. After
German advance into Czechoslovakia, Polish Foreign Minister Beck makes use of
British anger at the Germans and asks the British for a protection
agreement. Britain agrees. (1:493-494)
o.
18 March
i. Soviet
Foreign Minister Litinov offers a proposal similar to that offered by Bonnet on
March 16 – this to include the governments of Paris, London, Warsaw, Bucharest
and Ankara. Poland pushes back on any
agreement with the Soviets. (1:540)
p.
19 March
i. The
English Foreign Office asks the American one to a) continue the cooperation
between the two navies and b) to transfer the US Navy to Hawaii in the Pacific
– freeing up the British fleet for the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. On the 23rd, Roosevelt agrees to
both. (1:525)
q.
20 March
i. Roosevelt
introduces a bill in Congress to revise the neutrality laws. (1:525)
ii. Britain
makes its initial offer to Poland to take on a guarantee for its security.
(1:526)
iii. Britain
wants to include the Soviets in a guarantee arrangement for Poland, but Poland
refuses. (1:532)
r.
21 March
i. Von
Ribbentrop petitions to Ambassador Lipski for passage to Warsaw, to request new
negotiations. This is the fourth
attempt. (1:494)
s.
22 March
i. Hitler reincorporates Memel (Lithuania) into
the Reich. The poor treatment of German minorities in Poland intensifies.
(1:466)
t.
24 March
i. Poland
makes a partial mobilization of troops in Danzig, contrary to the German-Polish
Treaty. (1:494)
u.
25 March
i. A
“Directive of the Führer,” filed in the German Foreign Office: “Führer wants
however to solve the Danzig question non-violently. Would not like to push Poland thereby into
the arms of England. A possible military
occupation of Danzig would only come into consideration if Lipski intimates
that the Polish Government cannot publicly support a voluntary surrender of
Danzig….” (1:515)
v.
26 March
i. Lipski
returns to Berlin with a memorandum in response to German proposals;
fundamentally a clear “no.” Von
Ribbentrop replies that the only clear solution is reintegration of Danzig to
the Reich. Lipski answer is that “he has
the unpleasant duty to point out that any further pursuit of these German
plans, particularly so far as they concern the return of Danzig to the Reich,
means war with Poland.” This is the
first overt threat of war between the two countries. (1:495)
ii. Von
Ribbentrop replies: “That, for example, a violation of the Danzig sovereign
territory by Polish troops would be considered by Germany in the same manner as
a violation of the Reich’s borders.” (1:496)
iii. Hitler,
when informed by von Ribbentrop of the conversation, replies: “Of war, of
course, there may be no talk here.” (1:497)
iv. With
negotiations between Britain and Poland regarding a guarantee at an “impasse,” [perhaps
due to Britain’s desire to include the Soviets in the guarantee and Poland’s
refusal of same?] Roosevelt exerts influence over Chamberlain. He sends Ambassador Kennedy to Chamberlain,
indicating the danger of an insufficient guarantee for the Poles and for peace.
(1:526)
w.
27 March
i. German
Chargé d’Affaires in Washington, Hans Thomsen to Minister von Ribbentrop in
Berlin: “The announcements and measures of the American government in the last
few weeks show ever more clearly that President Roosevelt’s claim to leadership
in world political affairs is directed at the objective of destroying National
Socialist Germany with all available resources….” (1:526)
x.
28 March
i. Back
in Warsaw, Beck summons German Ambassador von Moltke to give him his
views. Beck: “That any intervention by
the German government for a change of the existing status quo in Danzig will be
regarded as an attack against Poland.” (1:497)
ii. Von
Moltke replies: “You want to negotiate on the points of bayonets.” (1:497)
iii. All
that is left for Germany is abandonment or war regarding Danzig. (1:497)
iv. Von
Moltke reports to Berlin regarding the Polish illusion of its armed-forces to
those of the Wehrmacht, and a statement from Vice-Minister of War Gluchowski:
“…therein he states that the German Wehrmacht is a big bluff, for Germany lacks
the trained reserves to fill out its units.
When asked whether he believes that Poland is seriously superior to
Germany, Gluchowski answered: ‘But that is self-evident.’” (1:567)
v. Madrid
falls to Franco and the nationalists, ending the Spanish Civil War. (2:100)
y.
31 March
i. After
arguments in favor by Lord Halifax before the Lower House, the British
government announces the guarantee of Poland against Germany. (1:498, 533)
ii. Paris
also declares a guarantee for Poland. (1:529)
z.
3 April
i. Hitler
gives the order for “Case White,” for the Wehrmacht to prepare
for an attack on Poland anytime from 1 September and on. (1:498) It is a
conditional directive. From the
directive: “German relations with Poland remain determined by the principle:
avoid disturbances. If Poland changes
its policy towards Germany, which up to now has been based on the same
principle, and adopts a threatening attitude toward the Reich, a final
reckoning may be required.” (1:516)
1.
“The political leaders consider it their task in
this case to isolate Poland if possible, that is to say , to limit the war to
Poland only.”
ii. The
Polish Foreign Minister travels to London to obtain in writing the British
guarantee. Both parties now assure each
other that they will assist each other in case of an indirect or direct threat
by other states. (1:534)
aa.
7 April
i. Italy
attacks Albania. (1:534)
bb.
13 April
i. France
and England offer a joint guarantee for Greece and Romania (1:534)
cc.
14 April
i. Roosevelt
sends a letter to Hitler and Mussolini, demanding guarantees not to attack 31
named states. (1:526)
ii. French,
British, and Soviet mediators begin discussing a possible alliance against
Germany. (1:540)
dd.
15 April
i. The
American naval attaché informs the French Navy High Command in Paris that
Roosevelt, without asking Congress, could order the American navy into the
Irish Sea or to the Philippines, if there should be any indications about the military
plans of the Axis powers. (1:526)
ee.
17 April
i. Soviets
propose a triple alliance to include France and Britain, against Germany.
(1:540)
ii. Soviet
Ambassador Merekalov in Berlin calls State Secretary Weizsacker, declaring:
“that ideological differences of opinion need not upset the German-Russian
relationship, as they do in fact the Russian-Italian relations…. The Soviet
Union has not used against Germany the current frictions between Germany and
the Western democracies, and also does not wish to do that.” (1:540)
ff.
19 April
i. Roosevelt
lets the British know it is indispensable that Britain adopt universal
conscription. Such a law is passed in
the Lower House on 28 April. (1:526)
gg.
24 April
i. General
staffs of Britain and France meet in London (through May 4) to discuss Poland;
mostly discuss the British-French cooperation in case of war. (1:534)
ii. Britain
promises 32 divisions to support France, Gamelin reports the number as 40 to
the French cabinet. (1:535)
hh.
27 April
i. Hitler
announces the cancellation of the German-Polish Friendship and Non-Aggression
Treaty of 1934, via memorandum to the Polish government and the next day in a
Reichstag speech. In the speech, he offers once again to negotiate on the
status of Danzig, while renouncing all claims to territories lost to
Poland. This is Germany’s fifth offer. (1:498)
ii.
28 April
i. Hitler
one more time makes an offer to the Polish Government: Danzig returns as a Free
State to the German Reich; Germany receives a road and railway corridor to
Danzig. In exchange, Germany recognizes
Poland’s complete economic rights in Danzig, with a free port and totally free
access; remaining boarders between Poland and Germany remain as present; a
twenty-five year non-aggression pact between Germany and Poland. (1:517)
jj.
3 May
i. Litinov
is replaced as Soviet foreign minister by Molotov. (7:115)
kk.
4 May
i. British
Ambassador writes from Berlin to Minister Lord Halifax in London: “Once again
the German case on the immediate issue is very far from being either
unjustifiable or immoral…. My thesis has always been that Germany cannot revert
to normalcy…until her legitimate (in German eyes) aspirations have been
satisfied…. According to my Belgian colleague, practically all the diplomatic
representatives here regard the German offer in itself a surprisingly
favourable one. The Dutch Minister, the
United States Chargé d’Affaires and my South African colleague have themselves
spoken to me in that sense.” (1:500)
ll.
5 May
i. Foreign
Minister Beck, regarding the demands of Germany, in the Sejm (the parliament in
Warsaw) says that the status of the Free City of Danzig is not based on
Versailles, but on traditionally belonging for centuries to Poland. (1:499)
ii. The
Polish government, by note, replies to the German cancellation of the
Non-Aggression Pact: Poland wants to negotiate, Germany has always pledged to
respect Polish rights in Danzig, and Poland has already met the Germans halfway
via the 26 March response brought by Lipski. (1:499) The rights Poland claims
for Danzig are those same rights offered by Germany in the previous German
proposals. (1:500) Poland demands Germany continues to respect the
Non-Aggression Treaty (ignoring the Polish army deployments to the outskirts of
Danzig on 24 March). (1:500)
mm.
11 May
i. On
the border between Mongolia and China near the river Khalkhin-Gol, armed conflict occurred
between the Soviets and Japanese; the Soviets in Mongolia and the Japanese in
China. (2:105)
1.
Incident between Mongolian cavalry and
Manchukuoan cavalry.
2.
Shortly thereafter, Soviet and Japanese forces
entered the war.
nn.
15 May
i. General
Gamelin of France promises to Poland’s Minister of War Kasprzycki to attack
Germany with the mass of the French Army in the event of war over Danzig.
(1:478, 529)
ii. When
asked by members of the French military delegation regarding Poland’s border
defenses, and if these will withstand a German attack, Polish Minister of War
General Kasprzycki replies: “We have no fortifications, for we intend to wage a
mobile war and right at the beginning of operations to penetrate into Germany.”
(1:567)
oo. 19
May
i. An
outcome of the meeting between the war ministers of France and Poland is a
written agreement obliging the French army to start an offensive against
Germany by the 15th day of conflict.
The document does not differentiate if Poland is attacked or first
attacks. (1:529)
ii. Churchill,
in a speech before the Lower House, justifying the desire to form alliance with
the Soviets: “without an Eastern front there can be no satisfactory defense in
the West. And without Russia, there can
be no effective Eastern front.” (1:543)
iii. In
the same speech, Churchill offers justification for the necessary sacrifice of
the Baltic states in any alliance with the Soviets: :What about the Baltic
States of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia for whose sake Peter the Great went to
war? Russia has the greatest interest
that these countries not fall into the hands of Nazi Germany.” (1:545)
pp.
23 May
i. Poland
until May has been in Hitler’s “wishful thinking” a potential partner. Now Poland becomes a victim. For the first time, Poland enters more
concretely into Hitler’s vague notions of “Lebensraum.” In a speech on this
date to his top generals, Hitler says as much.
qq.
31 May
i. Gamelin
writes the guidelines in support of the agreement to come to the aid of
Poland. It is not clear that any
offensive will begin within the 15 days, as stipulated in the agreement.
(1:530)
1.
Was Poland merely baited, with Gamelin having no
intention to follow through?
rr.
May
i. In
a fact-finding mission for the London foreign office, two officials report on
the confidence of the Polish military in any battle with Germany: “…one is
thinking to attack East Prussia at the start of the war because it would be
difficult for the Germans to reinforce the province promptly and adequately…”
“Anyway the general view seemed to be that East Prussia must be annexed by
Poland.” (1:472)
ss.
June
i. Harassment
of minorities in Poland increases in such a way that tension-free negotiation
is no longer possible. The situation also deteriorates “psychologically.” Hitler wants success, price is beside the
point. (1:501)
ii. Roosevelt
fails in Congress; Congress refuses to lift the arms embargo against warring
nations and to soften the neutrality laws. (1:527)
tt.
1 June
i. Soviets
declare “We will defend the borders of the Mongolian People’s Republic [against
Japan] as we defend our own.” (2:105)
uu.
7 June
i. State
Department warns that an oil embargo would “impel Japan toward moving into the
Dutch East Indies…therefore…no restrictions should be placed at this time on
the exportation of petroleum products to Japan.” (10:191)
1.
FDR agreed with this assessment. (10:191)
vv.
June
i. Roosevelt
tells Britain’s King George that if London were bombed, the US would enter the
coming war. (8:147)
ww.
8 July
i. Paris
and London present a draft treaty to Moscow. (1:541)
xx.
17 July
i. Paris
and London present a second draft treaty to Moscow. (1:541)
yy.
20 July
i. From
the weekly newspaper “Narod W Walce”
(People in the War): “Danzig must remain Polish, and Germany must be forced to
relinquish the East Prussian area without population to Poland.” (1:473)
zz.
24 July
i. A
treaty is initialed (but not signed) between France-Britain-Soviets. (1:541)
aaa.
26 July
i. US
notifies Japan of its intent to terminate the 1911 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation
with Japan; termination takes effect six months later, on 25
January, 1940.
bbb.
3 August
i. Berlin
offers to Moscow talks regarding an agreement. (1:545)
ccc. 4
August
i. Stalin
approves a document entitled “Agenda for the Negotiations with England and
France,” with five different plans of attack with up to 120 army divisions
against Germany. (1:541)
ddd.
5 August
i. Chargé
d’Affaires of the Soviet Embassy in Berlin, Astakhov, pays a visit to the
Senior Counselor in the Foreign Affairs Office, Schnurre. From Foreign Minister Molotov, he conveys
that the Soviet Union is interested in normalization and improvement of its
relations with Germany. (1:541)
ii. Customs
dispute erupts in Danzig. The tensions
escalate significantly. From the Polish
Commissioner-General, if directives issued by the Danzig Senate are not
reversed: “The Polish government without delay will take retaliatory measures
against the Free City.” Hitler advises
the head of the Danzig Senate to find a way to ease tensions. (1:557)
eee.
8 August
i. British
Ambassador Henderson comments on the Danzig customs incident, in a note to
Foreign Secretary Halifax in London. He
suggests that these actions tend to humiliate Hitler; if the actions are not of
His Majesty’s government, then all efforts should be taken to not drive Hitler
to react promptly, because of pride.(1:558)
ii. Swedish
mediator Dahlerus suggests a secret German-British-French-Italian talk about
peaceful settlement of the disputes. The
German Reich agrees immediately; England lets it be known that it cannot answer
at this time. (1:570)
fff.
11 August
i. British
and French delegations arrive in Moscow to discuss joint actions against
Germany. (2:106)
ggg.
12 August
i. Hitler
notifies Italian Foreign Minister Count Ciano that he will attack Poland after
the next provocation. To Ciano’s further
query, Hitler replies “End of August.”
In the meantime, Hitler is hindered by British and French attempts to
bring the Soviet Union to their side – an event which by Hitler’s own account
would have stopped him from any invasion plans. (1:520)
ii. Astakhov
contacts Schnurre a second time, informing him on behalf of Molotov that “on
the Soviet side one is interested in a discussion of the individual groups of
questions which have so far come up,” including the “Polish problem.” (1:546)
hhh.
13 August
i. Talks
begin in Moscow, including the military missions from Paris and London. From Marshal Voroshilov: “Soviet troops operating
against East Prussia and in Galicia, and England and France operating in the
West, it would be the end of Germany.” (1:542)
ii. Poland
continues its refusal to consent to such an alliance, (rightly) fearing that
the Soviets, in order to attack Germany, would have to march through Poland…and
might then never leave. (1:542)
iii.
15 August
i. Soviet-German
talks begin in Moscow. Moscow wants from
Germany: a moderating influence on Japan, as the two are still at war; a
non-aggression pact with Germany; a trade treaty with Germany; a joint
guarantee of the Baltic States (meaning a Soviet domination). (1: 546)
jjj.
16 August
i. From
British Ambassador Henderson in Berlin, to Lord Halifax, by telegram: “I would
recommend myself that the Polish Government should be persuaded – and persuaded
at once – to instruct the Polish Ambassador here to make some form of démarche which he should easily be
able to do through Göring …. Lipski after all is a ‘persona grata’ here…. The
Poles could deplore deterioration of the situation and suggest the maintenance
of the status quo ante March…to allow
diplomatic negotiations to start again.” (1:561)
kkk. 17
August
i. Two
telegrams from Halifax to Kennard, the British Ambassador in Warsaw, show no
reaction to Henderson’s telegram of yesterday. (1:562)
ii. In
a written response delivered to the German Ambassador, Molotov reiterates
points made on 15 August. Additionally,
he writes that, because of Germany’s anti-Soviet stance, the Soviet Union has
been forced “to take the first measures to prepare a defensive front against a
possible aggression against the Soviet Union from Germany’s side.” He continues: “that the Soviet government has
never had any aggressive intentions against Germany.” (1:547)
iii. Molotov
proposes a “special protocol,” but does not at this time reveal the
contents. It will later be shown that
the protocol includes: the German government will recognize that east Poland,
Bessarabia, Finland, and the Baltic sphere belong to the Soviet sphere of
interest. (1:547)
lll.
19 August
i. Attempt
by Britain-France to bring Soviets into alliance against Germany fails. (1:536)
They explain this is due to objections by the Polish government. (1:548) Russians
believe that a) France only wants to protect its borders, and b) as the British
delegation does not have full authority to negotiate, that the objective for
the Western democracies is for Russia to bleed alone against Germany. (1:542)
ii. Stalin
explains to the Politburo his decision for alliance with Germany, and not
England-France: a trio of England-France-Soviet Union against the Germans would
end the war too quickly. Germany
fighting only against France and England would drag out longer, wearing out the
forces of the participants further. (1:543)
iii. Stalin
decides to stop talks with Britain and France.
(2:108)
iv. Stalin
begins mobilization of Red Army in Mongolia.
Zhukov defeats the Japanese with lightning speed. (2:108) at 0545, 153
Soviet bombers, covered by fighter aircraft, carried out a surprise raid on
Japanese air bases and command posts. (2:114)
v. Stalin
holds a secret meeting of the Politburo.
He gives a speech, suggesting that Germany will certainly invade Poland
once the treaty between Soviets and Germans is signed; England and France will
then enter the war. The capitalists will
then wear each other out, and the Soviets must do all they can to prolong this
– in order to exhaust the two sides. For
this reason, the Soviets side with Germany. (2:109) Stalin: “If we make a pact
of mutual aid with Great Britain and France, Germany will give up Poland and…the
War will be averted.” (2:122)
vi. By
1600 hours, the German Ambassador is summoned to Molotov at the Foreign Office,
handing him a treaty with a provision that it is valid only with the signing of
the previously mentioned “special protocol,” not yet available. (1:548)
mmm.
19 August
i. Politburo
decision authorizes the formation of troops in inner districts to later move
these to the western front. (2:224)
nnn.
20 August
i. Hitler
sends a telegram to Stalin, informing him that he accepts the draft of the
Non-Aggression Pact, and he wants to send von Ribbentrop with “comprehensive
Proxy Power” for the signing of the treaty and the drawing up and signing of
the protocol. (1:548)
ooo.
21 August
i. Stalin
invites von Ribbentrop to Moscow, arrival date of 23 August. (1:548)
ppp.
22 August
i. In
a speech to his generals, Hitler says: “It was clear to me that sooner or later
it had to come to a conflict with Poland.”
This statement would not have been surprising to the generals, given
Poland’s actions against Germany over the previous two decades. (1:477)
ii. From
the same speech: “The relationship with Poland has become intolerable. My suggestions to Poland about Danzig and the
Corridor were foiled through the intervention of England. Poland changed its tone towards us. This stressful situation is intolerable in
the long run…. Now the time is more favorable than in two or three years.”
(1:521)
iii. Hitler
also mentions that he took the decision of the attack as early as the Spring of
1939. If true, this was the time of
Poland’s movement toward the British and French. (1:521)
iv. Hitler
at this time does not yet know that the “special protocols” will include, not a
joint guarantee for the Baltic States, but the inclusion of the Baltic States
and other parts of East Europe, including Eastern Poland, in the Soviet “sphere
of influence.” (1:548)
qqq.
22 August
i. Roosevelt,
at Daladier’s suggestion, calls for a World Peace Conference in Washington.
(1:570)
rrr.
23 August
i. Morning
newspapers are filled with reports of the flight of von Ribbentrop from Berlin
to Moscow. (1:572)
ii. Chamberlain
sends Henderson with a letter to see Hitler.
Hitler assures Henderson of his personal appreciation, then complains of
England’s attitude regarding Danzig: “Germany has made Poland a decent and fair
offer,” to which Henderson replies “that the German offer was indeed made, but
it had the character of a diktat.” “He (Hitler) sees no possibility by way of
negotiations because he is convinced that the British government is not
interested in such a settlement.” Hitler
regrets that England “makes him her enemy, he who himself wanted to be
England’s greatest friend.” Hitler stresses
“that Germany has never undertaken anything to the detriment of England,
nevertheless England places itself against Germany. “…at the slightest Polish
attempt to take actions against Germans, or against Danzig, he will intervene
immediately….” (1:572)
iii. Chamberlain’s
letter contains two new offers: the first is a play for time – that
negotiations between Poland and Germany be put on hold until the situation has
cooled down; the second is more substantial – Chamberlain holds out the
prospect for later negotiations parallel to those on the Danzig question “in
which it might be possible to discuss wider problems affecting the future of
international relations, including matters of interest to us and you.” (1:573)
iv. Hitler
replies to Chamberlain’s letter on the same day. Germany has tried in vain to win England’s
friendship; Germany has never sought conflict with England; Germany was
prepared to settle the Danzig question on terms of “unparalleled magnanimity”;
England has sabotaged this effort through cheap propaganda and the guarantee to
the Poles; Germany will no longer tolerate pressure and ultimatums to the
minority Germans in Poland and against Danzig.
The letter ends: “The question of the treatment of European problems on
a peaceful basis cannot be decided by Germany but primarily by those who, since
the crime committed by the Versailles dictate, have stubbornly and consistently
opposed any peaceful revision…. I have all my life fought for German-English
friendship; the attitude adopted by British diplomacy – at any rate up to the
present – has, however, convinced me of the futility of such an attempt. Should there be any change in this respect in
the future no one could be happier than I.” (1:575)
v. Hitler
has the High Command of the Wehrmacht prepare for attack on Poland on 26 August
at 430 hours. (1:575)
vi. Hitler
sends a telegram to Daladier: “I harbor no enmity against France. I have personally renounced Alsace-Lorraine,
and I have recognized the German-French border…. Now, the Polish challenges
have produced a situation for the Reich which cannot last…. I will not attack
France. But if it participates in the
conflict, I will go to the end.” (1:575)
Daladier’s reply is four days later. (1:576)
vii. Hitler
and von Ribbentrop conclude a Non-Aggression Pact with Stalin and Molotov.
(1:520) The pact is to be valid for ten years. (1:549)
1.
Immediately after the signing of this pact,
Stalin forms the 9th Army on the borders of Romania. (2:197)
viii.
Neither side is to come to the aid of Poland to
protect it from the other. (1:550)
ix. As
to the “special protocol,” von Ribbentrop is now surprised to learn of the
Soviet sphere of influence requirement.
Additionally, Stalin wants two ports in Lithuania and Latvia – without
this concession, there will be no treaty.
Von Ribbentrop, despite having full authority, is not sure how far he
may proceed. (1:549)
x. At
2000 hours, von Ribbentrop phones Hitler.
Hitler agrees, without much hesitation.
Everything is thereafter signed. (1:549)
xi. The
suddenness by which the German-Soviet treaty is signed, so shortly after the
efforts of England and France have failed, is a shock throughout Europe. Yet, Poland still makes no concessions on
Danzig. (1:550)
xii. The
French cabinet takes stock to determine if – even without Russia’s help – it
can meet its treaty obligations to Poland.
Through this, the following thoughts of Gamelin are revealed: a) he sees
at the earliest an aid to the Polish army only in the Spring of 1940, and not
15 days after the conflict, b) he viewed the point of the May agreement as one
where Poland would help France against Germany – as there was no German threat
against Poland when the agreement was made in May, he did not believe the
promise would be called, and c) there are not any plans to come to the rescue
of Poland in case of attack by Germany. (1:531)
1.
Bonet, the French Foreign Minister, does nothing
to warn his Polish counterpart of these facts. (1:531)
xiii.
In Mongolia, Zhukov completes his encircling
operation against the Japanese. (2:114) Zhukov is given the title of Hero of
the Soviet Union. (2:115) Stalin does not publicize this victory; implication
is in order to hide capability of Soviet military in order to surprise Germany
in the near future. (2:116)
sss. 24
August
i. Moscow
immediately notifies Roosevelt of the treaty with Germany. Including the “secret protocol” which divides
Poland in two. Roosevelt does not
immediately notify either Warsaw, London, or Paris. Instead, that evening he
sends a message to Warsaw and Berlin that one might find solutions via peaceful
negotiations. (1:551, 579)
ii. Hitler
confides to State Secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker that he believes England will
drop Poland (with the Soviet switch to the German side), and Warsaw will
concede to Hitler’s demands. (1:521)
iii. Roosevelt
sends a peace message to Hitler and Polish President Moscicki. His message: “refrain for a certain time from
any aggression,” and agree to direct negotiations. Hitler, who has been asking for direct
negotiations for some time, ignores the message from Roosevelt. (1:570)
iv. Prime
Minister Chamberlain, addressing the Lower House, reaffirms the allegiance of
Britain to Poland, and notes the uncompromising attitude of Germany regarding
Danzig: “[The Poles] have always been ready, as I am sure they would be ready
now, to discuss differences with the German Government.” (1:577)
v. Ambassador
Henderson reports to London: “With the Russian pact in his hands the initiative
is now Hitler’s….I anticipate an ultimatum to Poland.” “It was heartbreaking
since, as you know, I have held from the beginning that the Poles were utterly
foolish and unwise.” (1:577)
vi. Hitler
receives a message that today could see the signing of an English-Polish
Assistance Treaty. Hitler decides he
must gain time for further negotiations.
Hitler alters the attack on Poland, previously scheduled for 26 August,
to an unknown date. (1:578)
vii. Poland
closes the borders of Danzig. Supply
shortages soon follow. (1:580)
viii.
A commercial Lufthansa aircraft is shot by
Polish guns. (1:593)
ttt.
25 August
i. Hitler
offers London an alliance if the British government will be helpful in the
recovery and resolution of Danzig.
Germany will then guarantee Poland’s new frontiers, and will provide
German assistance in the defense of the British Empire wherever in the world it
is needed. After Czechia, London puts
little faith in German guarantees. (1:536)
ii. Swedish
mediator Dahlerus departs Berlin for London. (1:580) After his visit, he
conveys to Göring that there is hope for resolution. (1:587)
iii. London
and Warsaw conclude the assistance agreement previously pledged. The agreement includes support for military
resistance deemed necessary to counter a threat (whether direct or indirect)
against the independence of a treaty partner.
With this, it is left to Poland to decide when the indirect threat
becomes an act of war. (536)
1.
There is a secret additional protocol to the
agreement: it is only valid against Germany, and not, for example, against the
Soviet Union. (1:538)
iv. Hitler
receives several reports of clashes and strikes overnight on both sides of the
Polish-German border. (1:580)
v. Hitler
sends a message to Mussolini, attempting indirectly to gain Italy’s support for
the dispute with Poland. (1:581)
vi. Hitler
receives confirmation of the London-Warsaw agreement. (1:581)
vii. Hitler
meets with Henderson, reporting on the border clashes, and again holding hope
for a German-British agreement. “If the British Government would consider these
ideas, it could produce a blessing for Germany and also for the British Empire. If they reject these ideas, there will be
war.” Henderson re-affirms the
Polish-British alliance, and that the German offer of alliance cannot be
considered until Danzig is solved via negotiation. Hitler retorts that he has tried negotiation
for six months. (1:582)
viii.
Hitler follows this conversation with a note to
Henderson. (1:583)
ix. Hitler
confirms the new date for attack on Poland at 31 August, if there is no other
solution by then. His generals have
previously told him that they cannot begin after 2 September due to the risks
of weather. (1:583)
x. Hitler
meets with French Ambassador Coulondre, and asks him to send a message to
Daladier: “I bear no enmity whatever towards France….I find indeed the idea
that I might have to fight France on account of Poland a very painful one…. I
will not attack France, but if she joins in the conflict, I will go to the
end.” Coulondre replied that France would most certainly come to the aid of
Poland. He conveys that the reason for
giving blanket support to Poland goes back to Germany’s occupation of
Czechoslovakia, beyond the Sudeten region. (1:584)
xi. Mussolini
replies to Hitler that Italy is not prepared to join a war with Germany at this
time. (1:585)
xii. Halifax
tells Kennard in Warsaw to tell the Poles that they should do nothing to be seen
as the aggressor. France has delivered a similar message the day before.
(1:586)
xiii.
A second Lufthansa aircraft is shot at by Polish
guns; also a seaplane was shot. (1:593)
uuu.
26 August
i. Henderson
returns to London with Hitler’s latest proposal. (1:588)
ii. Dahlerus
returns to Berlin, with a seemingly positive report. (1:588)
iii. Hitler,
after midnight, summons Dahlerus and suggests that Henderson has perhaps not
understood Hitler. (1:588)
1.
Hitler asks Dahlerus to travel again to London
to convey his views: Hitler wants an immediate alliance with England, not
contingent on a solution for Danzig; England to provide assistance to Germany
to obtain Danzig and the Corridor; Germany will guarantee Poland’s borders;
etc. (1:589)
iv. Halifax
receives Count Raczynski, the Polish Ambassador; he sees the German solution as
no solution.
v. Ambassador
Coulondre reports to Paris from Berlin with a new proposal – an exchange of
population in the areas of the Polish-German border, relieving the minority
problem through deportations. Warsaw is
notified and agrees to this proposal. (1:590)
vi. Daladier
responds to Hitler’s message; no reference to the possibility of a population
exchange is mentioned. Beyond this, the letter confirms France’s support of
Poland. (1:590)
vii. A
Polish cavalry unit in the East Prussian district of Neidenburg is confronted
by soldiers of a Königsberg artillery battery.
Forty-seven Poles fall in machine gun fire. (1:591)
vvv. 27
August
i. Dahlerus
returns to Berlin after receiving London’s reply. He arrives late in the evening. (1:591)
Göring views the response negatively. (1:592)
www.
28 August
i. Beck,
responding now to open threats by Hitler and via third-party mediation,
declares he is agreeable to new German-Polish negotiations on the future of
Danzig. At the same time, he is evasive regarding specific talks. (1:501)
ii. Hitler
views the London reply (brought by Dahlerus) favorably. Most valuable is
London’s apparently agreeable reply to an alliance not conditioned on
settlement of the Danzig issue. He looks
forward to England’s assistance in bringing about a fair settlement. Finally, he agrees to the borders of Poland
being guaranteed not just by Germany, but also England, France, Italy and the
Soviet Union. Presumably this request by
London was in reaction to Hitler’s actions in Czechoslovakia. (1:594)
iii. Meanwhile,
London is preparing an official reply, which contains not a single word about
Danzig and the Corridor. This leaves
open the question- just what is Poland to negotiate? (1:596)
iv. Hitler
receives the official reply from Henderson, with the promise to study it
carefully. (1:597)
xxx. 29
August
i. It
appears in Berlin that morning that peace is coming. (1:597)
ii. The
Soviet High Command announces reinforcements on its western border.
Mobilization preparation begins in the several countries. The border between
Italy and France is closed. Switzerland convenes 100,000 border troops. (1:598)
iii. From
German Chargé d’Affaires in Washington: “Roosevelt holds neutrality to be
reprehensible….” Roosevelt wants to intervene militarily if England and France
fall into danger of defeat, or if it looks like there is certain prospect of
the English-French victory. (1:598)
iv. Upon
careful study of the response brought by Henderson the night before, certain
passages seem confusing – to indicate England will not commit to aid in the
negotiations with Poland. (1:599)
v. Hitler
replies that negotiations must commence in 29 hours: a Polish dignitary with
full authority to arrive in Berlin for this purpose. (1:601) Hitler justifies
this urgency with a statement that a serious disturbance can, at any time,
start the war. “Remember that my people are bleeding day after day.” (1:602)
vi. Henderson
attempts to secure such a Polish negotiator, even through the French and
Italian Ambassadors in Berlin. He then
notifies London of Hitler’s reply. “Hitler is not bluffing and at any moment a
clash may occur…” (1:602)
vii. In
Poland, they decide they must not concede on Danzig, and the only solution is
military, despite being advised by Britain to negotiate. Poland will announce the general mobilization
the next day. (1:603)
viii.
Göring, quite upset that peace is once again
slipping away, sends for Dahlerus: “Hitler intends to send to Poland in the
course of the next day a note which will contain such light conditions that they
certainly could be accepted by Poland and supported by the English Government.”
(1:604)
yyy. 30
August
i. At
1000, Kennard from Warsaw reports the situation in Poland to London. He believes Beck will not go to Berlin and
does not accept the short deadline. As
Poland did not accept similar proposals from Germany in March (prior to
England’s backing), Kennard see no reason why today – with England’s backing –
things would change. (1:610)
ii. Dahlerus
arrives in London. He believes Chamberlain has lost his patience and lost faith
in the usefulness of further negotiations. (1:605)
1.
Chamberlain considers Hitler’s offer of a new
proposal a “ruse to gain time.” Or perhaps a concern that it will be Poland
that then starts the war. (1:606)
iii. Against
England’s advice, Poland has mobilized. (1:606) At 1730 hours a report arrives
from the German Embassy in Warsaw that since this morning all over Poland the
general mobilization has been effectively proclaimed. (1:609)
iv. Hitler
forwards a new offer (the sixth) – or a new demand, as the Poles see it: a
referendum for the people in the Corridor. (1:501)
1.
The people of West Prussia-Pomeralia would
determine the belonging to Germany or Poland; the vote is to be under an
international commission made up of Italy, the Soviet Union, France, and
England; the region of Gdingen is excluded from this referendum, this region is
strictly Polish sovereign territory; for the benefit of the loser of the
referendum, an extra-territorial traffic zone will be established, consisting
of a highway and four-track rail line.
(1:502, 522) Hitler is quite
confident that this very moderate proposal will bring Chamberlain to the German
side. (1:612)
v. Poland
has until midnight to send a fully authorized negotiator to Berlin. Beck
accepts neither the time pressure nor Berlin as the negotiating venue. (1:502)
vi. Regarding
this proposal, French historian Rassiner writes (after the war): “It seems
correct that, if the French and British peoples had known of these propositions
on 30 August, Paris and London could not have declared war on Germany, without
unleashing a wave of protestations that would have imposed peace.” (1:504)
vii. From
the wife of the just resigned First Lord of the British Admiralty Cooper: when
hearing of the proposal, she finds it quite “reasonable.” Her husband, fearing the British public would
view it the same, calls the editors of the Daily Mail and the Daily Telegraph,
asking them to present the proposal in the most unfavorable light. (1:504)
viii.
At 1900 hours, Halifax sends a telegram to
Kennard in Warsaw: the Germans have accepted the English proposal to direct
German-Polish negotiations and the five-powers guarantee. He mentions nothing of the new information
from Dahlerus, instead stating that a new German proposal is forthcoming.
(1:610)
ix. Hitler
postpones again the start of the attack, from 31 August to 1 September. (1:609)
x. Washington,
Paris, and Warsaw implore each other to remain steadfast – no effort to reduce
the risk of the outbreak of war is discussed. (1:609)
xi. France’s
Chief of the Foreign Office Leger commits Daladier to the policy of not
compelling Poland to negotiate with the Germans; he does this in the presence
of the American Ambassador Bullitt. (1:609)
xii. In
Warsaw, American Ambassador Biddle is notified of what the Poles think about
Hitler’s proposal. Biddle notifies
Secretary Hull in Washington: Beck has said “no 40 times” to Hitler’s offer to
negotiate. (1:610)
xiii.
By 2300 hours, von Ribbentrop no longer expects
an emissary from Poland. (1:611)
xiv. French
Ambassador Coulondre in Berlin, writing to Prime Minister Daladier: “The trial
of strength is turning out in our favor. …reports speak of a growing
dissatisfaction among the population…. Now, as before, we must stand firm,
stand firm and again stand firm.” (1:622)
zzz. 31
August
i. Henderson
and von Ribbentrop meet just after midnight.
Henderson indicates the complaints of the Poles regarding German
atrocities at the border. To this, von
Ribbentrop loses control – just last night there are reports of more than 200
murders of ethnic Germans in Poland. The
conversation becomes icy. Henderson
indicates that the British government is not in a position to demand a
fully-empowered Polish negotiator to Berlin on such short notice. Von Ribbentrop comes to believe the British
have no desire to compel the Poles to yield. (1:613)
ii. Von
Ribbentrop pulls out of his pocket a paper with a new, 16-point proposal from
Hitler. He reads this to Henderson, but
refuses to give a copy, saying “It is outdated anyway, since the Polish
negotiator has not appeared.” Henderson
later presses Lipski to call von Ribbentrop directly and demand the proposal. After Lipski stonewalls, Henderson gets
personal: Lipski has done nothing for four months; this will be held against
him if war comes. (1:614)
iii. Meanwhile,
Dahlerus returns from London, optimistic.
Göring informs him of the new, 16-point proposal: “Hitler in his wish to
reach an agreement with England has worked out an offer to Poland, which is a
great concession from the German side and which, soince it is obviously
democratic, just and implementable, must cause a great sensation and can be
accepted by Poland as well as England.”
Both men believe they are near success in their struggle for peace.
(1:615)
iv. By
900 hours, Henderson has the written proposal; also Dahlerus sees Henderson. Dahlerus and Ogilvie-Forbes go to see Lipski
at 100 hours. They find Lipski, and
moving boxes, but otherwise an almost empty Embassy. (1:615)
v. Dahlerus
reads the proposal. Lipski, despite
being fluent in German, claims he does not understand it. Lipski states privately to Ogilvie-Forbes
that he has no interest in the proposal.
Once war begins, there will be riots in Germany and Polish forces will
soon be in Berlin. Thereafter, Dahlerus returns to the room and hands Lipski
the proposal. (1:616)
vi. Dahlerus
is complaining to London that the Poles are deliberately destroying any
possibility of negotiation. He holds the
German 16-point proposal to be “extremely liberal.” This phone call is extremely disturbing in
London, with Halifax finally slamming the phone; Halifax notifies Henderson
that he will accept no further such calls. (1:616)
vii. Henderson
receives the order by phone at 1300 hours to inform the Reich Government that
the Polish Government will now send its Ambassador to the German Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. (1:617)
viii.
Kennard receives a telegraph at 1345 to advise
the Polish Government to send its Ambassador in Berlin to receive the proposal
and forward this to Warsaw. There is no
mention of sending an authorized negotiator. (1:617)
ix. In
the meantime, Poland via radio has sent a message to Lipski to visit von
Ribbentrop, telling him that Poland has been notified by London of a desire to
enter direct negotiations, and that Warsaw will formally reply to London in a
few hours. Additionally, Lipski is not
to take the proposal, and has no authority to discuss any proposal.
(1:618) Hitler, via intercepting the
radio message, is aware of these instructions, and views the last hope for
peace as lost (It is now 1300 hours, just 16 hours from the planned time of the
invasion). (1:619)
x. Hitler,
despite by now being skeptical, approves a direct talk between Göring and the
British, only with Dahlerus present. (1:619)
xi. At
1630, Henderson, Ogilvie-Forbes, Göring, and Dahlerus meet. Göring suggests negotiations with Britain
negotiating on behalf of the Poles.
Henderson does not believe this will lead to any solution. Henderson asks Göring not to announce the details
of the 16-points over the radio. The
conversation ends at 1900, with nothing accomplished. (1:620)
xii. At
1830, Lipski meets von Ribbentrop. He
notifies him that Poland will shortly inform England regarding the request to
negotiate. Von Ribbentrop, despite
already knowing the answer, asks Lipski if he is empowered now to receive the
proposal or negotiate. Lipski replies he
is not. (1:621)
xiii.
As an exclamation point on the significant
deterioration of the situation on both sides of the Polish-German border, Poles
in Krakow murder the still acting German Consul. (1:562)
xiv. German
radio intelligence hears the instruction from Foreign Minister Beck to Lipski
in Berlin that he should not accept delivery of any new German proposal for
negotiations. (1:571)
xv. Swedish
mediator Dahlerus along with a British diplomat attempts to bring to the Polish
Ambassador Lipski in Berlin another offer from Hitler for negotiations. Lipski is not interested in receiving the
offer. According to Dahlerus: “…he in no
wise has any cause to be interested in notes or offers from the German
side. He well knows the situation in
Germany after five and a half years of activity as Ambassador…. He is convinced
that, in the event of war, riots will break out in this land, and the Polish
troops will march successfully against Berlin.” (1:568)
xvi. Mussolini
invites the government heads from Germany, Poland, France and England to a
Peace conference 5 September. The chief
theme of the conference is to examine certain provisions of the Treaty of
Versailles – the root of the specific issue at hand. As Hitler is aware of the
order from Beck to Lipski, the offer from Mussolini is of no meaning. (1:570)
French Foreign Minister Bonnet is of the opinion that the proposal should first
be approved by Paris and London before Hitler is invited. A process is established by which no outcome
is possible until late in the evening. The English government sees the proposal
as a trap, and advises not to brusquely reject it, but to first demand a
demobilization of all armies. (1:622)
xvii.
French Ambassador in Berlin, Coulondre, to
Foreign Minister Bonnet: “The German government, according to sure information,
is very angry that it has received no reply from Poland…. It would be entirely in the interest of the
Polish government to communicate without delay to Berlin that it endorses the
plan and will send Lipski with all the necessary instructions as a fully
empowered agent to negotiate.” The
message and tone is opposite from Coulondre’s communication with Daladier just
one day before. (1:622)
xviii.
Roosevelt, who has known of the secret protocol
between the Soviets and Germans (with the agreement that East Poland will be
lost), on this day wraps himself in silence. (1:623)
xix. US
Ambassador in Paris, Bullitt, assures his Polish colleague, Count Łukasiewicz,
that there is a secret protocol, but it only involves the three Baltic States –
not Poland. (1:624)
xx. At
2100 hours, German radio broadcasts the 16 Point Proposal. Between 2100 and 2200 hours, State Secretary
von Weizsacker presents written copies of Hitler’s proposal to the Ambassadors
of Great Britain, France, Japan, and the Chargés d’Affaires of the USA and the
Soviet Union. (1:624)
xxi. The
Daily Telegraph in London, in the evening edition, reports that after receipt
of the negotiation offer from Germany, Poland mobilizes its armed forces
instead of acknowledging the offer. The
edition is pulled, replaced with an edition that does not mention the
mobilization. (1:624)
aaaa.
September
i. Roosevelt
begins secret correspondence with Churchill, before Churchill is Prime
Minister. (5:93)
bbbb.
1 September
i. German
bombs fell on the Polish city of Wieluń at 4:20 AM. (7:119)
ii. Germany
invades Poland at 445 hours, without a formal declaration (perhaps because,
after Russia, France and England mobilized in 1914, Germany was the first to
declare war; Germany later was deemed the party responsible). (1:625)
iii. During
the fourth emergency session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, a universal
draft was ratified. This had not
occurred previously in Russian history.
It occurs not when tensions with Germany are high, but only after the
mutual non-aggression pact is signed. (2:123)
cccc.
3
September
i. Paris
and London declare war on Berlin. (1:625) Colonies join as well: Australia,
Burma, Ceylon, India, Jordan, Cambodia, Laos, Morocco, New Zealand, Tunisia,
and Vietnam. (1:626)
ii. The
war for Danzig is now a world war. (1:626)
dddd.
4 September
i. English
bombers attack German ships which lie at anchor. (1:626)
eeee.
5 September
i. German
submarines and the Royal Navy begin their war in the Atlantic. (1:626)
ii. Polish
High Command orders the Rudnicki Army in northwest Poland to give way before
the German army after destroying the food in the yielded area, leaving behind a
“desolate, devastated land.” (1:628)
ffff. 6
September
i. The
Reich issues instructions neither to shoot no control French merchant ships, attempting
to keep France out of the battle. (1:627)
ii. The
Polish newspaper Express Poranny
reports that the French army is marching into the Rhineland and that the Polish
air force is bombing Berlin. Neither is
true. (1:628)
gggg.
9 September
i. The
Wehrmacht has already taken all of West Poland up to the line formed by the
Narew River, the city of Warsaw, and the Bug River. (1:628)
hhhh.
10 September
i. In
violation of Belgian neutrality, British bomber overfly that country. (1:627)
iiii.
12 September
i. British
troops land on the continent, reinforcing the French. (1:628)
ii. France
deploys 80 divisions, against only eleven German division initially deployed.
(1:628)
jjjj.
13 September
i. The
Polish newspaper Express Poranny
has the headline “German Offensive Smashed in Poland.” (1:628)
kkkk.
15 September
i. The
activity of the German air force substantially drops; the German army was
almost out of fuel. (2:118)
ii. Soviets
achieve victory over Japan in the east, ensuring no future threat toward the
Soviet Union’s eastern borders. (7:117)
llll.
16 September
i. The
London Daily Express reports that the French have surrounded Saarlouis,
somewhat meaningless as the city lies on the border. And the announcement is
wrong in any case. (1:628)
mmmm.
17 September
i. Soviets
attack Poland without a war declaration; recapture area east of the Curzon
line, just as awarded in 1919. (1:431, 435, 628)
1.
The Soviets justify this: “The Polish government
has ceased to exist, and the Soviet Union therefore has had to take under its
protection the Ukrainians and White Russians living on Polish territory.”
(1:628)
2.
There is no repercussion to this by Britain.
(1:538)
ii. The
Polish government, including President Moscicki and Commander in Chief
Rydz-Ŝmigly withdraw to Romania.
nnnn.
18 September
i. The
armed forces of all of Poland west of the Curzon line up to Warsaw are
captured. (1:629)
oooo.
19 September
i. Britain
and France urge the Soviet government to withdraw its troops from Poland, else
a declaration of war will follow.
(1:629)
pppp.
25 September
i. Hitler
declares he wants the surrender of Warsaw. 560 tons of bombs are dropped on the
city that day, along with 72 tons of firebombs. (7:119)
qqqq.
28 September
i. Berlin
and Moscow agree on a second treaty regarding Poland, a treat on borders and
friendship. (7:117) The treaty assigns Warsaw to the Germans, Lithuania to the
Soviets. (7:127)
rrrr. 29
September
i. Warsaw
falls. England and France have neither
taken serious action against Germany, nor declared war on the Soviet Union.
(1:629)
ssss.
September
i. Stalin
begins dismantling the “Stalin line,” a line of defenses along the western
border; this after consolidating regions further to the west, ensuring a common
border with the Germans. (2:174)
tttt. October
i. England
and France begin secret contacts with the Russians inviting them to join forces
against Germany. (1:629)
ii. Stalin
demands concession from Finland of the Karelian Isthmus, in exchange for other
lands. The Isthmus is strategic to the
defense of Finland. (2:136)
uuuu.
4 October
i. Germany
and Soviet Union sign protocol, agreeing to common border; Poland is no more.
(7:127)
vvvv.
6 October
i. Hostilities
(of the official military type) come to an end in Poland. (7:122)
wwww.
22 October
i. Elections
held in what was eastern Poland (what the Soviets called “Western Belarus” and
“Western Ukraine”); only item was to authorize annexation to the Soviet Union.
(7:128)
xxxx.
13 November
i. From
TELEGRAM OF THE PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE USSR IN GREAT BRITAIN I. M. MAISKY TO
THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V. M. MOLOTOV, relaying
his conversation with Churchill: (3)
1.
I had today an appropriate occasion to talk
during a breakfast with Churchill in spirit of your telegram from November 11.
Churchill did not hide his satisfaction because in Moscow there is a desire to
improve Anglo-Soviet relations, and for this he noticed: "The main thing
is that there was a desire. If the desire exists, there will be ways and means
for its realization".
2.
To my question, how in this case it is explained
that the policy hostile to the USSR, which the British authorities now conduct
in the various ends of the world (I gave a number of examples), and to my
indication that without change of this policy, it is difficult to speak about
improvement in the Anglo-Soviet relations, Churchill answered:” You should
consider that a sudden turn of the Soviet policy at the end of August was big
shock for England.” …It is no big work for me on a number of examples to show
that it not so. Then Churchill began to recede and eventually declared that he
will take a closer interest in the matter and, that if the British diplomacy
really conducts now the anti-Soviet line, he will try to change a present state
of affairs, because he, Churchill, is a stau[n]ch advocate of the kind
relations between both countries.
3.
At the initiative of Churchill and in connection
with our general conversation on the Anglo-Soviet relations we spoke about
Finland much. Churchill's views are on this matter reduced to the following:
The USSR has all bases to be the dominating power in the Baltic Sea, and it
corresponds to the British interests. Our requirements (border change on the
Karelian Isthmus, islands in the Gulf of Finland, sea base at an entrance to
the Gulf of Finland) are in essence quite natural and lawful.
4.
The situation where a center similar to
Leningrad, is under fire of long-range guns from the Finnish border is
ridiculous. England cannot object to implementation of the Soviet requirements,
especially in view of that from the Soviet side Finland is offered a certain
compensation….England should not only keep from objecting to the implementation
of Soviet requirements, but she even has a moral obligation to facilitate the
USSR in their implementation as Russia lost the positions, including Baltic, as
a result of participation in last war on Entante's side…
yyyy.
September
i. Soon
after the war’s start, British Ambassador in Berlin comments: “[Germany’s]
post-war experiences had unfortunately taught Nazi Germany that nothing could
be achieved except by force or display of force.” (1:566)
zzzz.
15 November
i. Annexation
of eastern Poland into Soviet Union complete. (7:128)
aaaaa.
23 November
i. Speaking
at a meeting with the High Command of the German Army, Hitler said a war with
the Soviet Union can only begin after the war with the west had ended. (2:234)
bbbbb.
25 November
i. The
People’s Commissar of Defense of the USSR signed a directive to the Leningrad
military district; the directive regards conditions of war only against
Finland. (2:149)
ccccc.
26 November
i. Seven
artillery shells allegedly flew into Soviet territory from Finland. (2:137)
ii. Soviet
Union invades Finland. (1:554)
ddddd.
30 November
i. The
Red Army crosses the Finnish border, with the objective to take Helsinki by 21
December. (2:138)
ii. Units
of the Red Army take the small village of Terioki; a Finland communist
government is declared, with Kuusinen at the head. (2:138)
eeeee.
November
i. British
Admiralty pushes forward plans for invasion of Norway (6:249)
fffff.
1 December
i. The
Finnish communist government establishes diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union.
(2:138)
ggggg.
2 December
i. The
Finnish Communist government signs an agreement on mutual help and friendship
between the Soviet Union and the Finnish Democratic Republic. (2:138)
hhhhh.
16 December
i. Churchill,
in memorandum to the War Cabinet, writes that small neutral countries ought to
be glad to put up with some temporary inconvenience. “Humanity, not legality, should be the
guide.” (6:247)
iiiii.
Unknown
i. (Unknown,
but likely August) Confidence is so high that Polish newspapers print maps in
anticipation of a certain victory over Germany with borders extending to the
Elbe. The dreams of the Poles do not remain hidden from the Germans throughout
these two decades due to the many official and unofficial statements regarding
the acquisition of these territories. (1:472)
2)
1940
a.
January
i. Henry
Stimson writes letter to the editor of the New York Times: (10:196)
1.
“…there is no international question on which our
people are more thoroughly united than as to Japanese aggression against
China…More than four-fifths who have expressed their opinion in a recent Gallup
poll are in favor of stopping evil with an embargo.”
2.
“The very last thing which the Japanese Government
desires is a war with the United States.”
b.
6 February
i. Supreme
War Council approved detailed plans to land an army in Norway. (6:249)
c.
13 March
i. The
war between the Soviet Union and Finland was ended, after 105 days of winter
fighting; daylight was short, night was long.
The Soviets took the Karelian Isthmus; Finland retained her
independence. Having broken through the defensive lines, the Soviets did not
continue the advance. (2:140)
1.
The effort by the Soviets was undertaken in the
harshest conditions – average temperatures of 21 to 24 Celsius below zero – and
against one of the most impregnable defensive lines. (2:140)
2.
Instead of viewing the Soviet effort as weak,
considering the situation the lesson to be learned is that nothing is
impossible for the Red Army. (2:144) The Red Army was capable of carrying out
impossible orders, and it would not be stopped by any number of casualties.
(2:144)
d.
8 April
i. Britain
lays mines in Norwegian territorial waters, as prelude to invasion. (6:247)
e.
9 April
i. Germany
launches invasion of Norway. (6:247)
f.
11 April
i. Churchill
tells House of Commons that Britain had infringed Norwegian neutrality before
the German invasion was launched; his speech was reported in full in the press.
(6:231)
g.
April
i. The
Stimson Committee distributes thousands of copies of a booklet entitled “Shall
America Stop Arming Japan?” (10:197)
1.
An embargo against Japan would “leave China free
to achieve her own independence, which she doubtless can and will do against an
unaided Japan. No outcome could
contribute more to the peace and well-being of all Pacific nations.”
h.
7 May
i. Roosevelt
stations Pacific Fleet in Hawaii (8:34) Purported reason due to potential
Italian belligerence – joining Germany; if Germany invades low countries and
France, Holland and France could not defend their Asian territories against
Japan. (8:155/156)
i.
8 May
i. German
radio announced that the talk of two German armies being transferred to the
border with Holland was a “ridiculous rumor,” being circulated by “British
inciters of war.” (2:218)
j.
10 May
i. Germany
invades the West, from the North Sea to Switzerland. (6:194)
ii. Britain
occupies Iceland.
k.
11 May
i. With
Germany invading the Low Countries, Britain implements the “Splendid Decision” by
bombing German railway targets well outside of the area of military objectives.
(6:160)
l.
12 May
i. German
General von Kleist occupies Sedan, in Northern France. (6:194)
m.
13 May
i. Von
Kleist crosses the Meuse River in pneumatic boats, establishing a beachhead
south of Sedan, about four miles deep and four miles wide. (6:194)
ii. During
the night, the Germans repaired the Gaulier Bridge over the Meuse. (6:196)
n.
14 May
i. Heavy
tanks of the 1st Panzer Division under General Guderian crossed the
Meuse River. (6:196)
o.
28 May
i. Belgium
capitulates. (2:234)
p.
31 May
i. The
unfinished German cruiser Lutsow,
renamed the Petropavlovsk, arrived in
Leningrad during the time of war with Britain!
This was preceded (date TBD) by the sale to Stalin of an Italian
warship, the Tashkent. (2:128)
q.
May / June
i. Germans
drive British forces off of the continent. (2:234)
ii. Germans
allow evacuation
1.
Flotilla of commercial vassals – tugs, fishing
sloops, lifeboats, etc. – used to rescue soldiers: 220,000 Tommies and over
100,000 French support troops. (4:3)
2.
Hitler says to Göring “The war is finished. I’ll come to an understanding with England.”
(4:5)
r.
10 June
i. Italy
invades France (8:163)
s.
20 June
i. Roosevelt
names two prominent Republicans to lead the US military: Henry Stimson would be
secretary of war; Frank Knox would be secretary of the Navy. (10:202)
t.
22 June
i. France
falls. (2:234)
u.
25 June
i. Churchill
writes to Stalin, warning of German invasion. (2:234) Stalin receives message 1
July. (2:234)
v.
30 June
i. German
forces capture Guernsey, one of the Channel Islands. (2:234)
w.
June
i. Stalin
orders river warships to the Danube delta at a time when allied with Germany.
(2:192)
ii. TV
Soong and his wife are able to enter the United States without being arrested
(by law, entry was forbidden to Chinese nationals). Soong came for money.
(10:203)
1.
Eventually, China would receive almost three
times as much as America would spend on the atomic bomb project. (10:206)
x.
2 July
i. Roosevelt
signs into law the National Defense Act, giving Roosevelt executive control
over the export of valuable resources. (10:201)
1.
In the subsequent year, Japan gets more oil than
before. (10:257)
y.
16 July
i. Hitler
signs directive concerning preparations for landing troops in Great Britain, to
be completed by 15 August. Hitler changes plans upon Soviet annexation of
Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; Hitler sees risk
to oil from Romania and other resources from the north. (2:157)
z.
21 July
i. Hitler,
for the first time and in a tight circle, raises the idea of the “Russian
problem.” General Field Marshall W.
Brauchitsch receives an order from Hitler to begin developing a specific plan
of war in the east. (2:156)
aa.
29 July
i. Major
General Erich Marcks began planning a military campaign against Russia. (2:156)
bb.
20 August
i. Mao
orders 100 regiments against the Japanese in North China – 430,000 Mao
supporters against 830,000 Japanese. Mao’s forces scored significant victories
– tearing up Japanese-held railways, coal mines, bridges and power stations;
killing 20,000 Japanese and capturing great quantities of arms. (10:218)
1.
While Mao was fighting the Japanese, Chiang was
scheming about how to save his resources for the coming fight with Mao.
cc.
21 August
i. Leon
Trotsky murdered in Mexico by Spanish communist and NKVD agent Ramon Mercador.
Mercador returned to the Soviet Union and received the title “Hero of the
Soviet Union.” (2:178)
dd.
August
i. Roosevelt
and King George announce a Joint Board on Defense, amounting to an alliance.
(8:147)
ii. Stimson
rejects a proposal to further arms the Philippines. (8:194)
ee.
27 September
i. Germany,
Italy and Japan sign Tripartite Pact
ff.
October
i. In
a national address, Roosevelt tells nation of the risk from Germany: “Why
should we accept assurances that we are immune?” noting that similar assurances
were previously given to Holland and Belgium. (8:165)
ii. Chiang
instructs Chennault to go to the United States to work out plans to get
American planes and pilots. (10:224)
1.
The message was that China wanted to attack
Japan – a pipe dream from a military standpoint, but a ploy to secure planes
for the future fight against Mao. (10:228)
gg.
November
i. Molotov
tells Hitler that a new division of Europe is required. This proposed new division places at risk
Germany’s access to oil and other strategic resources. (2:182)
ii. Marshall
rejects proposal to further arm the Philippines. (8:194)
iii. Nomura
sent to Washington; Japan believes he will be viewed as a moderate. (10:257)
hh.
5 November
i. Roosevelt
elected for third term, by a large margin; he had stated many times that he
would keep the country out of the war. (10:214)
ii.
13 November
i. Hitler
relays to Molotov the need to retain a large number of German troops in
Romania, hinting that he felt the Soviet military posed a threat to Romanian
oil. (2:192)
jj.
14 November
i. Molotov
leaves for Moscow. (2:183)
ii. After
Molotov’s departure, Hitler conveys that Germany must plan to invade Russia.
(2:183)
kk.
25 November
i. German
ambassador to Moscow was told that German troops must withdraw its troops from
Finnish territory immediately. Further previous demands were reiterated: the
establishment of Soviet bases on the Bosporus and Dardanelles. (2:183)
ii. People’s
Commissar of Defense wrote a directive to prepare a plan for a new war of
aggression against Finland. (2:183)
ll.
28 November
i. Tokyo
announces establishment of a (puppet) government in Nanking as the legitimate
government of China.(10:215)
mm.
29 November
i. German
generals played strategic map battles, invading Russian territory, ending 13
December. (2:187)
ii. Roosevelt
instructs Treasury Secretary Morgenthau and president of the Export-Import Bank
Pierson to give Chiang a $100 million loan. (10:215)
nn.
16 December
i. British
nighttime raid of Mannheim, with 134 planes: “to concentrate the maximum amount
of damage at the centre of the town.” (6:174)
oo. 18
December
i. Hitler
signs Open Directive No. 21 ordering Operation Barbarossa – the attack on the
Soviet Union. (2:242)
pp.
23 December
i. Secret
conference of the High Command of the Red Army held for eight days, ending 31
December. 274 Marshals, generals,
admirals attended. Most lectures focused
on the tactics of sudden attack – by mechanized forces, air forces, etc. There was no meaningful lecture on defensive
tactics. (2:184)
ii. It
was agreed by Morgenthau, Know, Stimson and Marshall to transfer 100 outmoded
P-40 fighter planes to the Chinese, but not the bombers that were also desired.
Roosevelt approved. (10:230)
qq.
31 December
i. Forty-nine
of the highest ranking generals remained after the Red Army conference of 23
December and staying until 11 January, 1941.
Their purpose was to participate in a strategic game on maps, depicting
a battle between “Easterners” and “Westerners.”
All strategies were aimed at offensive operations by the Soviets –
“Offensive Operations of the Front with Breaks through the Fortified
Regions.” (2:186)
rr.
December
i. Stalin
and highest members of Politburo and commanders of Red Army discuss “special
operations at the initial stage of the war,” coded language for invasion of
Germany. (1:77)
ii. Roosevelt
secretly authorizes military staff talks between the United States and Britain.
(8:170)
3)
1941
a.
6 January
i. Roosevelt
gives “Four Freedoms” speech as part of
State of the Union; each is commemorated via a series of four paintings by Norman
Rockwell, in 1943 (12:38)
1.
Freedom of speech
2.
Freedom of religion
3.
Freedom from want
4.
Freedom from fear
b.
23 January
i. William
Donovan, a special emissary of US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, visited Belgrade and issued an ultimatum,
saying that if Yugoslavia permitted German troop passage then the US would not
"interfere on her behalf" at peace talks.
c.
January
i. Roosevelt
sends Harry Hopkins to London, who told Churchill: “The President is determined
that we shall win the war together. Make
no mistake about it….Whither thou goest, I will go; and where thou lodgest, I
will lodge; thy people shall be my people, and thy God my God.” Churchill wept.
(8:169)
ii. The
Joint Planning Committee of the US Army-Navy (Col. Joseph McNarney and Admiral
Turner) advise, it is reasonably certain that neither Germany or Italy will
initiate hostilities with the US, the initiation of hostilities by Japan may
depend on actions taken by the US that seriously threaten her economic welfare
or military adventures. In this case,
there is no assurance that Japan will not suddenly attack US forces. (8:188)
iii. US
intelligence proves “beyond a shadow of a doubt that the German General Staff
had agreed with Hitler that an attack [against the Soviet Union] suddenly be
launched in the coming spring. (8:204)
iv. Chiang’s
forces attack a unit of Mao’s army, massacring many. (10:218)
d.
1 February
i. Dean
Acheson sworn in as undersecretary of state for economic affairs. Acheson was fully supportive of an aggressive
blockade policy toward Japan, unlike his boss, secretary of state Hull.
(10:247)
e.
February
i. US,
British and Dutch officers meet in Singapore; authorized to agree to tentative
methods of command and operations, either jointly or separately. (8:171)
f.
11 March
i. Marshall
Timoshenko and Generals Zhukov and Vasilevsky, heads of USSR People’s Defense
Commissariat, forwarded to Stalin the plans to invade Germany. (2:xxii)
ii. US
approves Lend-Lease program
1.
The Lend-Lease policy, formally titled "An
Act to Promote the Defense of the United States", (Pub.L. 77–11, H.R.
1776, 55 Stat. 31, enacted March 11, 1941)[1] was a program under which the
United States supplied Free France, the United Kingdom, the Republic of China,
and later the USSR and other Allied nations with food, oil, and materiel
between 1941 and August 1945. This included warships and warplanes, along with
other weaponry.
g.
25 March
i. The
Yugoslav accession to the Tripartite Pact,
the Axis military alliance, was signed
h.
27 March
i. The
Yugoslav coup d'état occurred in Belgrade,
Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The coup was planned and conducted by a group of
pro-Western Serb-nationalist Royal Yugoslav Air Force officers formally led by
its commander, General Dušan Simović, who had been associated with a number of
coup plots from 1938 onwards.
1.
The Communist Party of Yugoslavia played no part
in the coup, although it made a significant contribution to the mass street
protests in many cities that signalled popular support for the coup after it
occurred.
i.
March
i. Japanese
minister of foreign affairs, Iosuke Matsuoka, arrives in Berlin for talks with
Hitler. He does not commit to a deadline
for action against the Soviets, leading to a clash with Hitler. (2:266)
ii. US
and British military staffs produce first full recorded agreement – ABC-1
(American-British Conversations #1); agreement draws US naval assets from the
Pacific to the Atlantic. (8:171)
iii. United
China Relief organization is formed in the US, bringing together
several different philanthropic organizations operating in China.
1.
The new board for this organization included
Pearl Buck, William Bullitt, Henry Luce, Robert Sproul, Wendell Willkie, John
D. Rockefeller III, Theodore Roosevelt Jr., David O. Selznick, and Thomas
Lamont. Eleanor Roosevelt served as honorary chairman.
2.
Little money goes to China; most is used for
propaganda in the US. (10:234)
j.
3 April
i. Churchill
writes to Stalin. It reaches Stalin on
19 April. (2:235)
1.
Churchill writes that the Germans, having
secured Yugoslavia, are transferring significant forces to Poland. (2:235)
a.
Significant to Churchill was deemed not very
significant to Stalin (2:236)
k.
5 April
i. Treaty
of Friendship and Non-Aggression signed between Yugoslavia and the
Soviet Union
l.
6 April
i. Germany
invades Yugoslavia.
m.
12 April
i. Rommel’s
forces reach borders of Egypt. (2:235)
n.
13 April
i. Soviets
and Japanese sign a pact. (2:202) Iosuke Matsuoka, on his return from Berlin to
Tokyo, stops in Moscow to sign a pact of neutrality between the Japanese and
Soviets. (2:266)
ii. German
army seizes Belgrade. (2:235)
o.
14 April
i. Nomura
and Hull begin secret talks. (10:257)
p.
16 April
i. St.
Paul’s Cathedral in London damaged in German air raid. (2:235)
q.
17 April
i. Yugoslavia
surrenders to the Germans (2:235)
r.
18 April
i. Greek
Prime Minister, Korisis, commits suicide. (2:235)
ii. Cable
sent from Nomura to Tokyo regarding understanding with the US; cable represents
apparent misunderstanding – Japan thinks it can stay in China and US thinks
Japan will exit China. (10:260)
s.
23 April
i. Greek
armed forces surrender to Germans. (2:235)
t.
4 May
i. Stalin
becomes chairman of the Soviet government, consolidating for the first time the
head of both party and government. (2:202)
u.
5 May
i. Stalin
speaks to graduates of the military academies; he spoke of the situation in
Europe and Germany. (2:204) Stalin made clear that there would be war with
Germany. (2:205)
ii. Flattering
article about Chiang in Life
magazine, crafted by China Lobbyist Eliot Janeway. (10:251)
v.
6 May
i. The
tone of Pravda propaganda suddenly
changes, toward a stance of war. (2:206)
w.
8 May
i. Henry
Luce arrives in China with his wife; they are given a flattering (and
fabricated) tour of the successes of Chiang. (10:251)
x.
18 May
i. German
battleship Bismarck and cruiser Prinz Eugen depart port of Gdynia in
Poland. Churchill appeals to Roosevelt
for help to find these ships. (8:181)
y.
20 May
i. German
forces commence airborne operations to capture Crete. 32,000 British and 14,000
Greek troops were defeated. (2:235)
z.
21 May
i. German
submarine sinks US merchant ship Robin
Moor; almost everyone survives.
German submarine allows passengers to take to lifeboats, and
to radio their location for help.
Germany apologizes, claiming the crew mistook the ship for British.
(8:183)
aa.
24 May
i. Britain’s
largest ship in the Atlantic, the Hood,
clashes with Germany’s largest battle ship, the Bismarck. The battle lasted eight minutes, with one direct hit
sinking the Hood. Of 1421 crew members, three survive. (2:235)
bb.
25 May
i. US
Coast Guard cutter Modoc sights the Bismarck, radioing location to the
British. Based on this report, a patrol
bomber supplied to the British under Lend-Lease – piloted by a US Navy officer
and mixed US-British crew – sinks the Bismarck. As such events failed to rouse Congress and
the public into war with Germany, Roosevelt stops using this as a tactic
shortly thereafter, not loudly publicizing further such incidents. (8:182)
ii. Command
of the Russian 31st Rifle Corps from the Far East arrives in the
Kiev district. (2:210)
cc.
28 May
i. Roosevelt
establishes
Office of Petroleum Coordinator for National Defense; appoints Interior
Secretary Harold Ickes to head. (10:260)
dd.
May
i. Soviets
decide to create five air assault corps. (1:75)
ee.
11 June
i. A
letter found on the captured son of Stalin, dated this day; from a junior
lieutenant: “I would like to be home by fall, but the planned walk to Berlin
might hinder this.” (2:258)
ff.
12 June
i. Kiev
military district commander receives secret orders, announcing the arrival
between 15 June and 10 July of the 16th Army (2:209); the relocation
from beyond the Baikal to the Ukraine began on 26 May. (2:210)
gg.
13 June
i. TASS
announces that “Germany was following the conditions of the Soviet-German pact
as flawlessly as the Soviet Union, “that the rumors of an impending German
attack on the USSR “were clumsily fabricated propaganda…” The words were
recognized as Stalin’s. (2:207)
1.
No directives followed, leading generals to
conclude the message could be ignored. (2:208)
2.
The TASS announcement was written to allay the
fears of Germany. (2:217)
ii. Orders
given for final preparation for war to tens of thousands of Soviet paratroopers
– indicating a planned offensive action. (2:75)
iii. Orders
for the Kiev military district are given, to move all deep-rear divisions
closer to the state borders. (2:208)
iv. 114
divisions in western military districts are moved toward the border. (2:213)
Preparations were not defensive, but offensive. (2:216)
v. John
Winant, US Ambassador to Britain, was instructed to tell Churchill that when
Germany invaded the Soviet Union and if Britain announced an alliance with the
Soviets, Roosevelt would immediately support it. (8:204)
hh.
14 June
i. Military
council of the Baltic district approved a plan for the relocation of a row of
divisions to the border zone. (2:211)
ii. Roosevelt
freezes all German and Italian assets. (10:201)
ii.
14 – 19 June
i. Military
councils of all western border districts directed to send to the frontline
their army field commands by 22/23 June. (2:211)
jj.
15 June
i. The
commands of several rifle divisions concentrated in the forests just east of
the city of Beltsy. (2:212)
kk.
16 June
i. Luce
publishes in Time: Sun Yat-sen was
“China’s George Washington.” (10:115)
ll.
18 / 19 June
i. Soviet
forces of the Black Sea fleet conduct training exercises, landing on “enemy”
shores. (2:194)
mm.
20 June
i. Replying
to an inquiry from MacArthur, Marshall told him that the War Department had no
intention to arm the Philippines. (8:195)
nn.
21 June
i. Soviets
practicing airborne assault operations. (1:75)
ii. Hitler
writes to Mussolini: “Russia is trying to destroy the Romanian oil fields…The
task for our armies is eliminating this threat as soon as possible.” (2:159)
iii. Hours
before the German attack, Churchill tells US Ambassador Winant that Britain
would go all out to aid the Soviets. (8:204)
iv. Missy
LeHand, Roosevelt’s secretary since the early 1920s, is carried out of the
White House on a stretcher. (10:261)
oo. 22
June
i. Germany invades Soviet Union at 3:15 AM.
ii. On
the Southwestern front, three of the most powerful Soviet Armies (the 12th
mountain, 6th, and 26th) were in the Lvov bulge,
surrounded on three sides by the Germans. (2:228)
1.
The 1st German Tank Group hit Lutsk,
Rovno, and Berdichev, cutting off the three Soviet armies in the bulge. The Germans quickly went through the Soviet
rear, capturing weapons, ammunitions, etc. (2:228)
iii. On
the Western front, in Byelorussia, the Red Army had four armies (3rd,
10th, parts of the 4th and 13th - altogether almost 30 divisions),
concentrated in the Byelostok bulge. (2:229)
1.
Two German tank groups struck the flanks and
linked east of Minsk. (2:229) From here, the path was direct to Smolensk and
Moscow. (2:230)
2.
Zhukov’s formations were not here (which would
have been appropriate for defensive operations), but further to the south.
(2:231)
iv. Included
in Hitler’s “blitzkrieg” army was a force of 750,000 horses; a convoy of 220
horses with carts followed each tank. (2:241)
v. Only
17 out of 253 German divisions were tank divisions. (2:241)
vi. Hitler
receives French surrender at the same place (Compiègne) and in the same rail
car where the Germans surrendered on November 11, 1918 (13:267)
pp.
23 June
i. Soviet
marines receive their “battle baptism” during the defense of the naval base at
Liepja. (2:194)
ii. US
Interior Secretary (and also named “Petroleum Coordinator”), Harold Ickes,
proposes an oil embargo on Japan.
Roosevelt disapproves, and tells Ickes that foreign policy was not his
business. (8:189)
qq.
25 June
i. Stalin’s
“Danube flotilla” landed reconnaissance and sabotage units of the NKVD on the
Romanian shores (indicating offensive actions). (2:192)
rr.
26 June
i. A
red flag goes up in the Romanian city of Kilia. (2:192)
ii. Japan’s
Foreign Minister Matsuoka presses for war with the Soviets. Military leaders did not want to do so as
long as war with the US remained possible. (8:221)
ss.
June
i. German
U-boats sink 61 British merchant ships during the month. (2:235)
tt.
1 July
i. Churchill,
in a letter to Stalin, reiterates an outstretched hand of friendship. (2:203)
uu.
2 July
i. Japanese
Imperial Conference adopted a policy that included war with the US as a real
possibility “In case the diplomatic negotiations break down…” (8:200) Japan
would prepare for war with either the United States or the Soviet Union, but
would not fight both simultaneously. (8:201) US is aware of the possibility of
Japanese invasion of Siberia. (8:202)
ii. Japanese
leaders decide to go south beyond China toward the rich resources of Southeast
Asia. (10:263)
vv.
7 July
i. Stalin,
still considering offensive operations, telegrams General Tulenev, demanding
that the Soviet Union retains Bessarabia at any cost as a springboard for
organizing invasion. (2:193)
ii. US
relieves Britain, taking over occupation/defense of Iceland.
ww.
8 July
i. First
contingent of mercenary pilots and support staff – about 160 individuals
altogether – depart for China from San Francisco. (10:262)
xx.
9 July
i. British
War Cabinet approves a directive to Bomber Command that switched its focus from
oil and naval targets to “destroying the morale of the civilian population as a
whole and of industrial workers in particular.” (12:62)
1.
Leaflets are dropped throughout Germany, warning
the population of this new campaign. (12:63)
yy.
10 July
i. Stalin’s
planned date for the full concentration of Soviet forces on the borders.
(2:216)
ii. Second
contingent of American mercenary pilots and support staff depart San Francisco
for China (10:263)
zz.
14 July
i. Roosevelt
urges Churchill to make a statement, “making it clear that no postwar peace
commitments as to territories, populations or economies have been given.”
(5:98)
aaa.
18 July
i. Roosevelt
informs cabinet that a reliable source (code breakers) thought that Japan would
occupy southern Indochina within three or four days. (10:263)
bbb.
21 July
i. Japan’s
ambassador to the US, Nomura, warns Welles that an oil embargo would risk war.
(8:190)
ccc. 23
July
i. Roosevelt
assigns a group of Army officers to study China’s Lend-Lease needs. He also approves 269 additional fighters and
66 bombers for Chiang-Chennault. (10:264)
ddd.
25 July
i. Harry
Hopkins asks FDR for permission to travel to the Soviet Union to meet with
Stalin regarding his exact war needs.
“Roosevelt assented immediately.” (5:21)
eee.
26 July
i. Reversing
recent and longstanding decisions, Roosevelt signs executive order, resulting
in embargo of oil to Japan. This is
viewed as the critical embargo. (8:189) This decision is accompanied by a
freeze on Japanese assets in the US, breaking off diplomatic talks, and arming
the Philippines. (8:192) These actions are known to be provocative regarding a
possible Japanese attack. (8:195)
1.
Embargo of octane 87 and higher; Japanese
aircraft could run on 86 octane. (10:209)
fff.
30 July
i. Hopkins
meets with Stalin, conveying: Roosevelt was determined “to extend all possible
aid to the Soviet Union at the earliest possible time.” (10:269)
ggg.
31 July
i. Roosevelt
meets with Soviet military delegation in the White House. (10:269)
hhh.
1 August
i. Upon
receipt of Hopkins’ cable summarizing talks with Stalin, “Roosevelt called a
cabinet meeting in which, according to Harold Ickes’s notes, the President
‘started in by giving the State Department and War Department one of the most
complete dressing-downs that I have witnessed.’” Per Morgenthau: “He said he didn’t want to
hear what was on order; he said he only wanted to hear what was on the water.”
(5:23)
iii.
3 August
i. Roosevelt
departs for his meeting with Churchill. (10:270)
jjj.
14 August
i. Roosevelt
and Churchill conclude Atlantic Conference, resulting in Atlantic
Charter, defining allied goals for the post-war world.
1.
Among other points, the Charter committed:
a.
no territorial gains were to be sought by the
United States or the United Kingdom;
b.
territorial adjustments must be in accord with
the wishes of the peoples concerned;
c.
all people had a right to self-determination
kkk. 17
August
i. Roosevelt
meets with Nomura upon his return to Washington. (10:279)
lll.
August
i. In
response to FDR’s orders to ship hardware to Russia, General Marshall writes to
Secretary of War Stimson: “…our entire Air Corps is suffering from a severe
shortage of spare parts of all
kinds. We have planes on the ground
because we cannot repair them….” (5:26)
ii. Roosevelt
meets Churchill at Argentia Bay, Newfoundland, to discuss and conclude the
Atlantic Charter. (5:94)
mmm.
4 September
i. German
submarine fires on US destroyer Greer, missing her. Greer, having been alerted by a British
plane, had been tracking the submarine and reporting her position to the
British, attacking the submarine repeatedly.
Roosevelt describes the attack as unprovoked. (8:183)
ii. No
oil had left the US for Japan in a month. (10:280)
nnn.
5 September
i. German
units surrender to the Soviets at the bend of the frontline, near Elnya – the
most strategically significant region of the theater of operations. (2:265)
ooo.
7 September
i. Hirohito
emphasizes to Imperial Conference that diplomacy must take precedence over
preparation for war. (8:228) Thereafter, Konoe approaches Grew, prepared to
agree to Hulls’ four preconditions.
After being denied by Hull, Grew directly approaches Roosevelt regarding
a direct meeting with Konoe. Roosevelt
would not agree to the meeting. (8:230).
ppp.
11 September
i. Ground-breaking
for construction of Pentagon
qqq.
22 September
i. Foreign
Minister Toyoda (having replaced the bombastic Matsuoka) proposes terms to end
the war with China. These fell on deaf
ears in the US. (8:230)
rrr.
28 September
i. Japan
provides a document with principles to be agreed to at the outset and matters
to be settled based on these principles.
This proposal has no effect in the US. (8:230)
sss. September
i. Nine
“Flying Fortress” long range bombers, capable of reaching Japan, arrive in the
Philippines; thirty-five more followed in November. As noted by newly arrived Army Air Corp
General Lewis Brereton, the bombers were not afforded adequate fighter
protection – inviting pre-emptive Japanese attack. His protest was noted by Marshall. (8:196)
ii. US
Ambassador to Japan, Grew, emphasizes point to Roosevelt that Japan was likely
to react to the July measures by going to war against the US. (8:215)
iii. Japanese
Prime Minister Konoe presses for a personal meeting with Roosevelt. (8:215)
ttt.
14 October
i. Unable
to achieve any progress toward peace, Konoe resigns; Hirohito names Tojo as new
Foreign Minister with a charge to “go back to blank paper” and do all he could
to avoid war with the United States. (8:232) Tojo formed a cabinet primarily
favorable toward peace. (8:234) Tojo pressed for, and achieved, a delay in the
final decision toward war; November 25 would be the new deadline for the end of
negotiation Later extended to November 29). (8:235)
uuu.
17 October
i. US
destroy Kearny was attacked while escorting British merchant ships; when
submarines attacked the convoy, the Kearny fired on them – the submarine fired
back. (8:184)
vvv. November
i. FDR,
in a press conference, emphasized the freedom of religion and conscience
afforded in the Russian constitution. (5:25)
ii. Roosevelt
orders a navy task force to join in trying to sink the German battleships Admiral Scheer and Tirpitz. (With no result) (8:182)
iii. Japanese
tankers depart San Pedro empty, with no oil. (10:282)
www.
3
November
i. Marshall
and Stark, along with an Army-Navy Board meeting, proposed making no ultimatums
toward Japan. (8:239)
xxx. 11
November
i. Japan
presents “Proposal A” to the Americans, with offers of free trade for China and
a gradual removing of troops from both China and Indochina. (8:235)
yyy. 15
November
i. Nomura
meets with Roosevelt to discuss “Proposal A.”
Roosevelt replies that before considering it, Japan must start removing
troops from China and Indochina. (8:236)
zzz. 18
November
i. Nomura
would “tactfully feel out Hull” on Proposal B, which provided for a truce and
return to conditions as of July 1.
(8:236)
aaaa.
19 November
i. Intercepted
message to Nomura indicates that if Proposal B is rejected, no further
concession can be made. Translation was marked completed on November 20.
(8:242)
bbbb.
20 November
i. Nomura
formally presents Proposal B to Hull.
Hull presents the proposal to the various allies. Hull and Roosevelt had
already known the text of the proposal for two weeks. (8:236) Marshall and
Stark saw Proposal B as advantageous for the US, giving the military time to
arm. (8:237)
cccc.
22 November
i. Hull
presents a State Department response to Proposal B to the various allies; all
were in general agreement except for the ambassador from China, Hu. Hull
conveyed this general agreement to Nomura, and to expect a formal reply within
two days. (8:243)
dddd.
24 November
i. Roosevelt
agreed to the State Department response, seeing it as a way to buy time for the
military. (8:243)
eeee.
25 November
i. Hull
relays Chiang Kai-shek continuing protests regarding this response to Japan,
dissatisfied with the number of troops to be left in Japan for the interim and
leeway in access to oil. Roosevelt felt
he could resolve this concern.
ii. That
evening Hu formally presented Chiang’s objection to Hull. (8:244)
iii. Stimson’s
infamous words: “…how should we maneuver them into the position of firing the
first shot…” (8:257)
ffff. 26
November
i. The
decision to present the revised proposal to Japan is reversed, just hours
before it is to be presented to Nomura. (8:245) No consultation with allies
(other than the aforementioned protest by China) is recorded. (8:246)
ii. The
US administration instead presented a new, ten-point proposal; while not an
ultimatum, the effect would be to bring about the end of talks. (8:247)
iii. After
presenting this ten-point proposal, Roosevelt sent a message to Churchill,
expecting “action within two weeks.” (8:263)
iv. Six
Japanese aircraft carriers depart Hitokappu Bay in the Kurile Islands, headed
for Pearl Harbor. (10:284)
gggg.
27 November
i. Japanese
leaders realize Proposal B has been rejected; the fleets were already on the
way to Pearl Harbor, but with orders to return just in case resolution is
reached. (8:238)
hhhh.
29 November
i. Reporter
Joseph Leib, a friend of Secretary Hull, reports: [Hull] on…November 29,
1941…revealed to me and gave me a copy of an intercept which showed that he had
information that Pearl Harbor would be attacked the following week.” Hull assures Leib that both Roosevelt and the
FBI are aware of this information. (8:50)
ii. On
this final deadline date, Tokyo cabled Nomura to make one last attempt. Hull responded to Nomura that Japan had been
furthering Hitlerism: “…there is absolutely no way of bringing about a
settlement…” (8:248)
iii. Intercepted
messages confirm that Japan feels that negotiations are broken, with no further
hope. (8:248)
iiii.
1 December
i. The
final decision for war is proposed in Japan; Hirohito nodded in agreement.
(8:238)
ii. Tokyo
cables diplomatic offices in Washington and London to destroy codes and other
documents. (8:267)
jjjj.
2 December
i. Roosevelt
tells a subordinate that he expects to be at war with Japan within a few days.
Crucial intelligence was withheld from Short and Kimmel in Hawaii. (8:267)
kkkk.
5 December
i. It
is possible that Knox was about to state the location of Japanese carriers in a
cabinet conversation. Roosevelt cut him
off. (8:273) Knox’s aid Beatty states, years later, that Wilkerson had told
Knox that naval intelligence had located Japan’s aircraft carriers. (8:274)
llll.
6 December
i. At
the daily press briefing, the White House press secretary told reporters that
they had no need for pads and pencils – the president has decided to take the
day off. Meanwhile, Roosevelt had a full
appointment schedule. (8:274)
ii. US
intelligence intercepts message #901, the pilot message for a further message
(#902) to be sent in fourteen parts. (8:274) The next message was sent in
English, to ensure no time was lost for the translation. It was clear that the
message meant war. (8:275)
iii. By
9 PM, 13 of the 14 were received, and delivered to most of the people on the
lists (military and civilian). Roosevelt received his by 9:30 PM. (8:276)
mmmm.
7 December
i. Part
fourteen is received by Roosevelt at 10 AM Washington time. (8:285)
ii. Marshall
is out that morning, riding his horse and not reachable. At 10:30, Marshall is
reached, and thereafter takes one-hour to make a seven-minute trip to the
office. (8:285) He deliberately reads
the fourteen messages (later claiming he only saw these for the first time on
Sunday). Colonel Bratton attempted to
suggest that the summary of the message was that the Japanese would attack this
day, and that warning messages be sent to various Pacific commands. (8:286) The
official (not intercepted) final message was to be delivered at 1 PM; it was
assumed the timing was to coincide with the beginning of the attack.
(8:287) No warnings were sent until
after the attack began. (8:289)
iii. Japanese
attack Pearl Harbor (8:1)
iv. Japanese
attack the Philippines, destroying unprotected US bombers. (8:197)
v. Japan
lands 20,000 troops on the east coast of Malaysia toward Singapore and the
Dutch East Indies for oil. (10:286)
nnnn.
8 December
i. China
declares war on Japan (despite years of fighting, previously war was not
officially declared), Germany, and Italy. (8:291)
ii. Dutch
East Indies – despite not having been attacked yet by Japan – declare war on
Japan and Germany. (8:291)
iii. US
Congress declares war on Japan. (10:7)
oooo.
10 December
i. General
Magruder in China writes to Marshall that Chiang intends to hoard American aid
in order to fight internal enemies and consolidate power. (10:289)
pppp.
11 December
i. Germany declares war on the United
States. Hours after this, the United States declares war on Germany.
qqqq.
20 December
i. Ten
Japanese bombers take off from Hanoi to bomb Kunming, China. Claire Chennault’s fighters brought down four
of them, at the cost of one fighter. (10:292) The Flying Tigers were born,
(10:293) and Walt Disney designs their logo. (10:294)
4)
1942
a.
1 January
i. “Declaration of Shared Commitment,” by 26
nations – forming the initial “United Nations,” formed to defeat the “Tripartite
Pact” of Germany, Italy and Japan (12:7)
1.
“Being convinced that complete victory over
their enemies is essential to defend life, liberty, independence and religious
freedom, and to preserve human rights and justice in their own lands as well as
in other lands, and that they are now engaged in a common struggle against
savage and brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world…”
b.
5 January
i. Magruder
describes Roosevelt’s expectation that Chiang would fight the Japanese an
“alluring fiction.” (10:289)
c.
9 January
i. Roosevelt
to Morgenthau: “I am anxious to help Chiang Kai-shek…I hope you can invent some
way of doing this.” (10:291)
d.
30 January
i. After
a private meeting in the White House with TV Soong, Roosevelt orders
secretaries of State, Treasury, and Commerce to immediately grant China the
$500 million loan with no strings attached. (10:292)
e.
9 February
i. General
Stillwell goes to White House to meet with Roosevelt; he will be commander of
the China theater. He had served there
and spoke Chinese. (10:297)
1.
Once in China and after meeting Chiang, he tells
a reporter (off the record): The trouble in China is simple: We are allied to
an ignorant, illiterate, superstitious, peasant son of a bitch.” He finds nothing by yes-men surrounding
Chiang.
f.
19 February
i. Secret
contacts between Stalin and Hitler, during time when Stalin was allied with
Roosevelt and Churchill (2:xxi)
g.
10 March
i. Roosevelt
to Churchill, suggesting that India is today what the American colonies were
during the American Revolution. (5:100)
h.
18 March
i. Roosevelt
writes to Churchill: “I know you will not mind my being brutally frank when I
tell you that I think I can personally handle Stalin better than either your
Foreign Office or my State Department.
Stalin hates the guts of all your top people. He thinks he likes me better, and I hope he
will continue to. (5:15)
i.
28 March
i. British
attack of Lilibeck by 234 aircraft. (6:177)
j.
30 March
i. Lindemann
Plan in Britain, calling for strategic bombing of working-class housing in
Germany. (date not certain) (6:105)
k.
1 April
i. FDR
writes Churchill; Hopkins and Marshall will travel to London to present the
plan for an allied invasion across the channel, to be undertaken as early as
the fall of 1942. (5:32)
l.
11 April
i. FDR
writes to Stalin, proposing a meeting next summer near the common border of
Alaska: “I have in mind a very important military proposal involving the
utilization of our armed forces in a manner to relieve your critical Western
Front. This objective caries great weight
with me….” (5:39)
1.
Stalin offers no satisfactory reply. (5:40)
m.
24 April
i. Churchill
writes to Hopkins of his desire to reduce shipments to Russia until the
shipments can be better protected. (5:28)
n.
26 April
i. Roosevelt
responds to Churchill (from 24 April above): “I have seen your cable to Harry
this morning relative to shipments to Russia.
I am greatly disturbed by this…any word reaching Stalin at this time
that our supplies were stopping for any reason would have a most unfortunate
effect. (5:28)
o.
1 May
i. Churchill
replies “With very great respect what you suggest is beyond our powers to
fulfill.” (5:29)
p.
Late May
i. Molotov
travels first to London, then Washington, in quest for a second, western front
no later than the coming fall. (5:35)
q.
30 May
i. Molotov
meets with Roosevelt: all land secured in the agreement with Hitler will remain
with the Soviets; a “straight answer” regarding the immediate opening of a
second front must be given. Marshall
replied “Yes.” (5:35)
r.
9 June
i. On
the way back to Moscow, Molotov stops in London with a draft communiqué
regarding the urgent task of opening a second front in Europe in 1942. Churchill dismissed the communiqué “out of
hand.” (5:35)
s.
7 July
i. First
day of issue for five-cent US postage stamp featuring Abraham Lincoln
and Sun Yat-sen. (10:294)
t.
14 July
i. Churchill
writes FDR: “Only four ships have reached Archangel…out of thirty-three…”
(5:29)
u.
29 July
i. FDR
writes Churchill: “We have got always to bear in mind the personality of our
ally…” (5: 29)
ii. FDR
to Churchill, pushing for an immediate grant of independence for India. (5:101)
v.
7 October
i. FDR
writes Churchill: “I think there is nothing more important than that Stalin
feel that we mean to support him without qualification and at great sacrifice.”
(5:31)
w.
October
i. Chennault
writes to Roosevelt; with a very small air force and Chennault holding full
military command in China (replacing Stilwell), he could bring about the
downfall of Japan. (10:300)
1.
Marshall judged the plan as nonsense. (10:301)
2.
Stilwell warns Roosevelt that without a ground
force capable of seizing and holding airbases, the plan was impossible.
(10:302)
x.
December
i. FDR
writes Stalin again, asking for a meeting – this time in Africa. Stalin remains uninterested. (5:40)
y.
30 December
i. Roosevelt
asks Stalin about establishing US air bases in the eastern Soviet Union for
purposes of attacking Japan. Stalin
refuses. (2:268)
5)
1943
a.
8 January
i. Again,
Roosevelt asks Stalin about establishing US air bases in the eastern Soviet
Union for purposes of attacking Japan.
Again Stalin refuses. (2:268)
b.
13 January
i. Stalin
writes to FDR: “…what we need is not air force units, but planes without
pilots, because we have more than enough pilots of our own…” Stalin goes on to
question why FDR proposes a visit by General Bradley to inspect Russian
military objectives; also Stalin does not understand why General Marshall
should visit the USSR. Finally, Stalin
expresses displeasure that operations in North Africa have come to a
standstill. (5:41)
c.
January
i. Roosevelt
first speaks to the notion of unconditional surrender – “Uncle Joe might have
made it up himself.” (5:43)
d.
18 February
i. Mayling
Soong (Madame Chiang Kai-shek) spoke to the US House of Representatives.
(10:302)
e.
13 March
i. German
generals begin planning in secret for the Battle of Kursk. (2:245)
f.
18 March
i. JOHN
FOSTER DULLES, Chairman of the Commission to Study the Bases of a Just and
Durable Peace, delivers “The Six Pillars of Peace” at a Luncheon
Meeting of Financial, Labor, Religious and Educational Leaders, New York City
1.
“In 1940, the Federal Council of Churches voted
to set up a Commission to study the bases of a just and durable peace. For over
two years we have been at work.”
2.
“…there is a decision which must be made now,
both from the standpoint of winning the war and winning the peace. That
decision is: Will the American people now commit themselves to a future of
organized international collaboration within the areas of demonstrated world
interdependence?”
3.
All six pillars emphasized the need for
international bodies and international cooperation.
g.
27 March
i. Stalin
informs Anastas Mikoyan of the German intent for battle in the summer – the
Battle of Kursk. (2:245)
h.
7 April
i. After
previously promising (then backing out of) a cross-channel landing for the
prior fall, now the Americans were not able to land in Sicily. Eisenhower writes to Churchill that the
invasion of the island would have to be postponed until the Allies had greater
military strength. (5:37)
i.
5 May
i. Roosevelt
again asks Stalin for a meeting, via Joseph Davies (and not, Admiral Standley,
Ambassador in Moscow) (5:41)
j.
25 June
i. Churchill
writes FDR, expressing concern that FDR wants a private meeting with Stalin – excluding
Britain. (5:42)
k.
5 July
i. Battle
of Kursk begins. (2:245)
l.
9 November
i. Roosevelt
proposes a single European command – for both Normandy and the Mediterranean;
Churchill turns him down immediately. (5:62)
m.
22 November
i. Cairo
Conference, with Roosevelt, Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek; make decisions about
post-war Asia. (10:306)
1.
Churchill names him “Cash-my-check.”
n.
28 November
i. At
Teheran, Stalin informs FDR that he does not like unconditional surrender. Churchill agrees. (5:44)
1.
First
conference of the big three leaders.
2.
Main commitment was to open a second front
against Nazi Germany.
o.
29 November
i. Churchill
is a target of Stalin’s verbal jabs; FDR and Stalin joke about selecting 50,000
German officers for execution after the war. (5:50)
p.
1 December
i. FDR
agrees to support the shift of Poland to the east, but conveyed to Stalin that
he could not publicly support any such move, as six or seven million Poles
lived in the US, and an election was upcoming. (5:45)
q.
17 December
i. Passage
of the Magnuson Act in the United States, also
known as the Chinese Exclusion Repeal Act.
r.
21 December
i. Roosevelt
writes to Churchill, conveying his desire to offer one-third of the Italian
naval fleet to Stalin. (5:53)
6)
1944
a.
16 January
i. Churchill
writes to FDR, noting that offering one-third of the Italian fleet to the
Soviets was never discussed at Teheran. (5:53)
b.
29 February
i. Roosevelt
sends to Churchill the Hurley report on Iran, suggesting that Britain’s
imperialism must cease; the report further emphasizes the Soviet place in the
world, include their positive relations with Iran. (5:99)
c.
2 March
i. Roosevelt
announces in a news conference that he had “given” one-third of the Italian
fleet to Stalin. (5:53)
d.
7 March
i. Churchill
drafts and sends a strong letter of displeasure to FDR regarding the gift of
Italian ships to Stalin. Britain has
borne the brunt of the naval losses since the beginning of the war. (5:54)
e.
21 May
i. Churchill
replies to Hurley report, defending British Imperialism as a force for
spreading democracy. (5:100)
f.
Summer
i. Stalin
informs Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky that he would be chief commander in a war
against Japan. (2:268)
ii. For
the most part, those entrusted with preparing the plan for invasion of Germany
in 1941 were also entrusted to develop this war plan. (2:276)
iii. Japan
wipes out Chennault’s air bases as men like Marshall and Stilwell predicted.
(10:312)
iv. Roosevelt
sends letter to Chiang through Stilwell; given the terrible defeats
for Chiang, Roosevelt threatens to cut off all aid unless Stilwell is put in
charge.
1.
Chiang replies that he would like Stilwell
replaced, and Chiang would welcome any other general that Roosevelt would place
in charge.
g.
July
i. FDR
forces Chiang to allow US officials to contact Mao; on the way, they saw
healthy people and animals – unlike in Chiang’s China. “Morale is very high.”
(10:310)
h.
August
i. Beginning
of the three-month Warsaw Uprising.
Despite the capability to do otherwise, Stalin did not offer assistance
to the Poles against the Germans. (5:57)
i.
25 August
i. Churchill
writes draft letter to Stalin and sends to FDR.
The purpose is to encourage Stalin to support the Poles. FDR strongly objects to sending the letter.
(5:58)
j.
9 September
i. Churchill
letter to his chiefs of staff: “Once again I draw attention to the extreme
importance on grounds of high policy of our having a stake in central and
southern Europe and not allowing everything to pass into Soviet hands with the
incalculable consequences that may result therefrom.” (5:61)
k.
19 October
i. Stilwell
recalled from his command in China by Roosevelt.
l.
6 November
i. Stalin
calls Japan an aggressor for the first time. (2:268)
7)
1945
a.
4 February
i. Yalta
(Crimea) Conference, with Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin, legitimizes for the
Soviets various territories taken by force. (5:69)
b.
13 February
i. The
bombing of Dresden begins. (6:177)
c.
28 February
i. A
few US embassy political officers in China sign a letter to Washington, with
the view that Chiang was only in it for Chiang, and Mao held the cards when it
came to fighting Japan – completely counter to the acceptable thinking in
Washington. (10:322)
1.
Per John Service, to his mother: “We may become
heroes – or we may be hung.”
d.
6 March
i. Churchill
is apprised about mass arrests by the Soviets of Polish intellectuals, priest,
professors, etc., taking place in Cracow.
Six-thousand former Home Army officers were put in a camp. The fruits of Yalta were beginning to become
plain to the world. (5:78)
e.
8 March
i. Churchill
writes to Roosevelt, apprizing him of the picture taking place in Eastern
Europe – particularly the “cruel joke” perpetrated on the Poles regarding free
elections. He asked Roosevelt to join
him in a letter of protest to Stalin.
Roosevelt did not. (5:78)
f.
9-10 March
i. Curtis
LeMay’s “Operation Meetinghouse” air
raid of Tokyo was later estimated to be the single most destructive
bombing raid in history.
1.
334 B-29s took off to raid with 279 of them
dropping 1,665 tons of bombs on Tokyo. The bombs were mostly the 500-pound (230
kg) E-46 cluster bomb which released 38 napalm-carrying M-69 incendiary
bomblets at an altitude of 2,000–2,500 ft (610–760 m).
2.
Approximately 15.8 square miles (4,090 ha) of
the city was destroyed and some 100,000 people are estimated to have died.
3.
Bombers departed from captured islands, as China
was still not secure enough for air bases. (10:330)
g.
21 March
i. Ambassador
to Moscow, Averell Harriman to Roosevelt: “I feel the time has come to reorient
our whole attitude, and our method of dealing with the Soviet government. Unless we wish to accept the 20th
century barbarian invasion, with repercussions extending further and further,
and in the East as well, we must find ways of arresting the Soviet domineering
policy.” (5:81)
h.
24 March
i. Harriman
to Roosevelt, regarding the brutal and callous treatment by the Soviets of
Americans being freed from German prison camps. (5:81)
i.
26 March
i. Roosevelt
replies to Harriman: “It does not appear appropriate for me to send another
message now to Stalin…” (5:81)
j.
28 March
i. Eisenhower
telegram directly to Stalin, outlining Eisenhower’s strategy for the remainder
of the European war. The telegram did
not identify Berlin as an Allied objective. Churchill saw the telegram only
after it was sent to Stalin; shocked regarding the gift of Berlin to the
Soviets. (5:84)
k.
2 April
i. Harriman
to Roosevelt: “I feel certain that unless we do take action in cases of this
kind, the Soviet government will become convinced that they can force us to
accept any of their decisions on all matters and it will be increasingly
difficult to stop their aggressive policy.” (5:81)
l.
5 April
i. Soviet
Union cancels the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact. (2:268)
m.
11 April
i. US
Army reaches the Elbe River, 60 miles from Berlin. (5:85)
n.
12 April
i. Roosevelt
dies. (10:325)
o.
19 April
i. John
Service, US embassy official in China, and one that recommended working with
Mao in the war against Japan, has his hotel room bugged by the FBI. Service was giving background briefings to
journalists, and he tells Amerasia
magazine editor Philip Jaffe that he has some documents regarding Chiang and
Mao. (10:329)
1.
He is arrested by the FBI shortly thereafter.
2.
Thus begins the search (witch hunt) for “Who
lost China.”
p.
April
i. US
Captain Archimedes Patti of the OSS parachutes in to meet Ho Chi Minh at his
base north of Hanoi. Patti spoke fluent
French and spent hours in conversation. (10:333)
1.
His purpose was to help
coordinate attacks against the Japanese.
2.
He met several more times with Ho Chi Minh
thereafter.
q.
8 May
i. V-E Day
r.
17 July
i. Potsdam
(Germany) Conference, with Truman, initially Churchill, and when he lost the
election, Attlee, and Stalin.
1.
Purpose to decide how to administer punishment to the defeated Nazi
Germany. The goals of the conference also included the establishment of
post-war order, peace treaty issues, and countering the effects of the war.
s.
6 August
i. US
drops nuclear bomb on Hiroshima
t.
8 August
i. At
shortly before midnight, Japanese Ambassador in Moscow is notified: “Starting
the next day, August 9, the Soviet Union will consider itself in a state of war
with Japan.” As the day in Vladivostok starts seven hours before it does in Moscow,
in fact the attack referenced in 9 August below had already begun! (2:272)
ii. In
eleven days, Soviet troops covered more than 800 kilometers. (2:274)
iii. Chennault
is given an un-ceremonial boot out of China. (10:333)
u.
9 August
i. US
drops nuclear bomb on Nagasaki
ii. Soviets
carry out sudden and crushing attack on Japanese in Manchuria and China.
(2:272)
v.
10 August
i. John
McCloy divides Korea at the 38th parallel for the purpose of
accepting the Japanese surrender, with Russia to the north and the US to the
south. (10:344)
1.
The US would govern the south with the help of
the Japanese.
w.
14/15 August (due to Int’l Date Line)
i. V-J Day
x.
2 September
i. MacArthur
accepts the Japanese surrender in Tokyo Bay. (10:332)
ii. 400,000
Vietnamese gather in Hanoi’s central square, celebrating their day of
independence. Ho Chi Minh reads an
almost direct copy of Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence opening: “All men
are created equal; they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable
Rights….”
y.
26 November
i. Ambassador
Hurley, having left China two months before, learns he is criticizing him
regarding “the rotten Hurley policy” that had “now committed us to armed
intervention” in China’s internal affairs. (10:334)
1.
Hurley responds with a letter of resignation to
Truman.
z.
December
i. Truman
sends Marshall to China to broker a truce between Chiang and Mao, but Marshall
fails to bring peace. (10:334)
aa.
Unknown
i. Soviets
remove 2 million Poles still living east of the Curzon line, sending them west
as part of the forced migrations. (1:431)
8)
1946
a.
1 July
i. Founding
of National War College
9)
1947
a.
18 September
i. Founding
of Central Intelligence Agency
ii. Founding
of US National Security Council
10)
1948
a.
June
i. Mao
and Chiang have about equal numbers of men and armaments. (10:335)
b.
October
i. About
300,000 of Chiang’s soldiers defect to Mao. (10:335)
c.
November
i. Chiang
sends an urgent appeal to Truman, warning that Mao’s warriors were “within
striking distance” of Shanghai and Nanking.
He asked for speedy military assistance. (10:335)
d.
16 December
i. Memorandum
prepared by Joint Chiefs of Staff tell Truman there was “now obviously grave
doubt as to whether the arrival in China of any further military equipment for
the Chinese National Government will buy any time at all.” They are further
concerned that the weapons will only end up in the hands of the Communists.
(10:335)
e.
December
i. Mayling
comes to Washington demanding $3 billion in aid. Truman later remembers, regarding Chiang, the
Soongs, and all: “I discovered after some time…[they] were all thieves, every
last one of them…” (10:336)
11)
1949
a.
January
i. Chiang
prepares to flee mainland China, first stopping in Shanghai to transfer the
government gold reserves to Taiwan. (10:337)
b.
1 October
i. Mao
Zedong stands over Tiananmen Square and announces his rule. (10:338)
12)
1950
a.
25 June
i. North
Korea crosses the 38th parallel. (10:346)
b.
27 June
i. Truman
dispatches the United States Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait, to
prevent hostilities between the Nationalist Republic of China (Taiwan) and the
People's Republic of China (PRC)
c.
29 June
i. Eight
US Air Force cargo planes depart for Asia with war material for the French in
Vietnam. (10:348)
d.
29 September
i. MacArthur
restores the South Korean government of Syngman Rhee.
e.
30 September
i. Marshall
sends an “eyes only” memo to MacArthur: "We want you to feel
unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of the 38th
parallel."
1.
MacArthur boasts that if Mao confronted the US
military, “[I will} deliver such a crushing defeat that it would be one of the
decisive battles of the world – a disaster so great it would rock Asia and
perhaps turn back Communism.” (10:349)
f.
1 October
i. MacArthur
demands unconditional surrender.
g.
2 October
i. Through
Indian Ambassador Panikkar, Chinese premier and foreign minister Zhou Enlai
sent a message to the US: If the Americans crossed the 38th
parallel, Mao would intervene. (10:350)
h.
3 October
i. Dean
Acheson ridiculed Mao’s threat. (10:350)
i.
9 October
i. MacArthur
crosses the 38th parallel. (10:350)
j.
25 October
i. 200,000
Chinese
troops enter Korea.
k.
8 November (approx.)
i. Soviet
Union provides air cover to China in North Korea.
l.
Mid-December
i. UN
forces retreat back to the 38th parallel.
13)
1953
a.
27 July
i. Active
military operations end in Korea.
14)
1954
a.
7 April
i. In
a press conference, President Eisenhower speaks of the domino theory: “You have
a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to
the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly.” (10:352)
b.
7 May
i. French
lose Battle of Dien Bien Phu, effectively ending
French military action in Vietnam.
c.
26 June
i. With
the backing of the Eisenhower administration, Ngo
Dinh Diem is named prime minister of the state of Vietnam; the
appointment was widely condemned by French officials, who felt that Diem was
incompetent.
d.
20 July
i. Agreement
on Geneva Accords, ending the First Indochina
War.
1.
Free elections were to be held in 1956. (10:352)
a.
Eisenhower scuttled the elections, as he later
admitted: “It was generally conceded that had an election been held, Ho Chi Minh
would have been elected Premier.”
15)
1957
a.
8 May
i. Eisenhower’s
personal plane brings President Diem of South Vietnam for a visit to
Washington. (10:353)
1.
250,000 people cheered Diem during a parade in
New York. (10:354)
16)
1963
a.
2 November
i. President
of the Republic of Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem, is
assassinated in a CIA engineered coup.
b.
22 November
i. US
President John F. Kennedy is
assassinated.
1.
Both Diem and Kennedy were reportedly against
inserting American combat troops in Vietnam. (10:356)
c.
24 November
i. New
US President Lyndon Johnson tells US Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot
Lodge: “I am not going to lose South Vietnam.
I am not going to be the President who saw Southeast Asia go the way
China went.” (10:357)
17)
1971
a.
15 July
i. Nixon
publicly announces his upcoming trip to
China.
b.
22 July
i. John
Service and John Davies – pilloried for having “lost” China to Mao by Senator McCarthy
– appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. (10:365)
1.
Service jokes: “This is the first Senate meeting
where I have appeared without need of counsel.”
c.
September
i. John
Service receives a call – he is invited to visit
China by Zhou Enlai. (10:365)
18)
1972
a.
21 February
i. Nixon goes to China, meets with Mao Zedong.
19)
1975
a.
30 April
i. End
of the Vietnam War for the United States.
1.
The US dropped more than three times the tonnage
of bombs during Vietnam than they did in both the European and Pacific theaters
of WWII. (10:361)
1)
1939 – The War That Had Many Fathers, Gerd
Schultze-Rhonhof; 2011 Olzog Verlag GmbH, Munchen Germany
2)
The Chief Culprit: Stalin’s Grand Design to
Start World War II, Viktor Suvorov; 2008 Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD.
3)
THE TELEGRAM OF THE PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE
USSR IN GREAT BRITAIN I. M. MAISKY TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V. M. MOLOTOV
4)
The Last Lion, William Manchester
5)
Roosevelt and Stalin: The Failed Courtship,
Robert Nisbet; 1988 Regnery Gateway, Washington, D.C.
6)
Advance to Barbarism, FJP Veale; 2013
Ostara Publications
7)
Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and
Stalin, Timothy Snyder; 2010 Basic Books
8)
The Pearl Harbor Myth: Rethinking the
Unthinkable, George Victor; 2007 Potomac Books
9)
The Imperial Cruise: A Secret History of
Empire and War, James Bradley; 2009, Back Bay Books
10)
The China Mirage: The Hidden History of
American Disaster in Asia, James Bradley; 2015, Little, Brown and Company
11)
A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the
Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East, David Fromkin; 1989,
Avon Books
12)
The Good War That Wasn’t – And Why It Matters,
Ted Grimsrud; 2014, Cascade Books
13)
The Lost History of 1914, Jack Beatty;
2012, Bloomsbury
14)
The
Western Front, Hunt Tooley; 2003 Palgrave MacMillan
15)
The
Russian Origins of the First World War, Sean McMeekin; 2011, The Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press
Hello my friend ! First of all, it was great effort you spend on this and thank you doing so!!.
ReplyDeleteThere is 2 Videos on Youtube about this so far I could see from Gerd Schultze-Rhonhof (the 1st source) .
As far as I can remember in his version he is telling the version is different from yours here ?.
My question is: Did you "rule out" (or other said erase) some of his mentions by adding the other versions? Like, you did compare all sources and add it together on this final version here ?
As you can see from the list of sources immediately above your comment, I have incorporated multiple sources to develop this timeline. I did not take one source as the definitive source, but found value in each of these several sources.
ReplyDelete