Like clockwork, someone in the mainstream regularly pummels
Germany for producing more than it consumes and for running a less insensible government
fiscal policy than that of most other states.
Recently I commented on the tag-team
laments of Ben Bernanke and John Mauldin on this topic; today it is Ambrose
Evans-Pritchard.
As I must do on this topic or any other macro-economic
topic, I offer a caveat; macro-economics as currently practiced in the
mainstream is nonsensical. The data aggregates
are nonsense and the practice is nonsense.
Even the idea of a trade deficit is nonsense.
Specifically regarding this worrisome trade deficit: if I,
as an individual, produce more than I consume I am considered a productive
member of society (at least I think this view is still generally held). If I and all of my neighbors who reside within
an arbitrary line on a map produce more than we consume, it is considered a
disaster. It takes a Ph.D. to come to
this conclusion.
With that caveat out of the way, let’s look at the laments
of Ambrose:
Germany’s current account surplus
is out of control.
Why should it be “in” control? What does “control” even mean? Like saying I should be only a little
productive, but not too much; I should save only a little, but not too much; I should
have little available for investment – not too much. Of course, there is also the question: who
should control it? Macro-economic policy
recommendations in today’s world require force.
Germany must be punished according to AEP; yet, he laments
the weakness of the current punishment mechanism:
…cynics might justifiably conclude
that big countries play by their own rules in Europe…
Instead big countries should play by the rules of a higher
level of political authority:
The EMU punishment machinery is
highly political, in any case.
Every political “punishment
machinery” is “highly political,” in every
case. Why would the EMU punishment machinery
be any different? What does Ambrose
expect? You want non-political
punishment machinery? Try the free
market – it is your only option. But then what would Ambrose (and virtually every
macro-economist) do for a living?
It isn’t merely that Germany is naughty; it is abusive –
like wife-beating or something:
Germany’s surplus is not caused by
a one-off shock…. It is a chronic structural abuse….
They aren’t even shy about using violence to deal with the
situation; Germany should be punched. Don’t
believe me?
“The European Commission should
stop pulling its punches: Germany should be fined,” said Simon Tilford, from
the Centre for European Reform.
Since Germany is being abusive, such a punch could be
considered an act of coming to the defense of another…I guess. For some reason, I do not believe that the
NAP is at the root of the thinking here.
For Ambrose, the root of the problem appears to be that
Germany presciently went through a significant labor restructuring more than a
decade ago – wage freezes, wage reductions, more liberal work rules, etc.:
This was achieved by squeezing
wages in the early years of EMU, undercutting the South.
The solution seems simple enough: wages and work rules in
other European countries can be similarly reduced and liberalized. Apparently, this solution is – for some
reason – not possible today; it might cause…well, wait – let Ambrose tell you:
Efforts by France, Spain, Italy,
Portugal and Greece (super-competitive Ireland is irrelevant to this debate) to
claw back lost ground by doing the same at this late stage is precisely what
pushed the EMU system as a whole into a quasi-deflationary slump from 2011 to
2014.
Deflation – the
bogeyman of falling prices. Someday,
when the refining fire of the coming calamity has cleansed the world of
nonsensical macro-economic thinking, people might once again discover the wonders
that accrue in a world of falling prices (and bankruptcies).
Instead of falling prices throughout Europe, the German government
should spend:
Berlin has refused to offset anemic
demand with extra government spending.
Why not say “Paris has refused to liberalize labor regulations”? Spend, spend, and spend some more. For a macro-economist, the answer to almost
every question: spend.
Finally, Ambrose comes to the bridge that must be either crossed
or burned:
German surpluses did not matter in
the days of the D-Mark. The country revalued from time to time, correcting the
problem. How Germany ran its own internal affairs were largely its own
business. But as the IMF has repeatedly stated, it is an entirely different
matter in a monetary union. The German surplus lies at the root of EMU’s
North-South divide.
Either all EMU nations join into a fiscal union, or the EMU
comes apart. These aren’t the only two possibilities
– government bureaucrats could just allow market forces via bankruptcies and restructuring
to do their Godly work. So far, they are
quite unwilling to allow this – at least when it comes to banks and
sovereigns.
In the meantime, the solution is force:
…the eurozone can order Germany to
present an "action plan" to cut the surplus. If that fails, EU
ministers then sit in judgment on Germany. They can force Berlin to pay a
deposit of up to 0.1pc of GDP (€2.4bn) into a special account…
“…order…sit in judgement…force….” Well, this comes with some risk:
Needless to say, any such sanction
would cause outrage in the Bundestag and risk destroying German political
consent for the euro.
If this comes to pass, that will be a glorious day of
deliverance.
Ambrose concludes with a chastisement:
The sooner Germany abandons fiscal
fetishism and invests its own money in its own country for its own good, the
better it will be for everybody.
There is a good strategy – the British telling the Germans
what is good for them. How many times
has that worked well in history?
One of many follies of mainstream macro-economics: there is
no rational (meaning properly constructed) bridge that connects micro-economics
to macro-economics. The macro policy
recommendations are almost always exactly the opposite of that which makes
sense for the individual.
But it won’t last for long.
Then people like Ambrose will have to restructure their own wages and
work rules. Maybe this is why they fear deflation!
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