Kevin Vallier has an essay posted at Cato Unbound, entitled “A
Genuinely Liberal Approach to Religion in Politics.” The topic is of interest to me only to the
extent that religion is often used as a tool for promoting nationalism (which
is a religion unto itself in any case) and war-mongering (which writers
such as Laurence
Vance have covered quite well).
Vallier begins his assessment:
…I begin by contrasting my approach
with three more familiar alternatives: I term these the libertarian, religious
conservative and secular progressive
views about religion in politics.
The topic as introduced by Vallier interests me little,
except for his statements regarding libertarian views on the topic and his
introduction of Murray Rothbard’s views (or as Vallier complains, lack of
views) on the topic.
Given the venue, I begin by
assessing the libertarian approach, or more accurately, what I see as
libertarians’ lack of an approach to religion in politics.
In terms of a lack of libertarian views on this topic, this
should be of no surprise. Libertarian theory is concerned with one question –
when is the use of force justified? Many
concepts around the security of property and life fall out naturally from a
thoughtful consideration of this question, but this question is the root.
Therefore, libertarians as libertarians will have little to
say on this topic. Vallier demonstrates,
at least partially, one reason for why this is so:
…the more general attitude is that
religion in politics is uninteresting because democratic politics should be
dramatically weakened or abolished…
It is one reason, but a very secondary reason. It is true that libertarians as libertarians
consider that “democratic politics [more accurately, monopoly government] should
be dramatically weakened or abolished….”
However, the primary reason that libertarians are uninterested in this
question is because libertarian theory is only concerned with the question of
the proper use of force – from this, the position on “democratic politics” is a
natural result.
Vallier, starting down the wrong path, cannot help but
compound his mistakes. The general attitude of libertarians, he claims, is that…
…private property alone will then
answer these questions. This attitude is
based on a principled form of property-rights
reductionism, where all that
matters is whether property rights are being respected or violated.
Vallier emphasizes “all,”
as if to emphasize even further his lack of understanding of libertarian theory. A well-grounded view of private property will
answer many questions (or, in some of the more difficult issues, at least
provide a roadmap). But libertarian
theory will not answer “all” questions
– and those well-grounded in this theory are the first to say so. Rothbard
answers why this is so:
Libertarianism does not offer a way
of life; it offers liberty, so that each person is free to adopt and act upon
his own values and moral principles. Libertarians agree with Lord Acton that
"liberty is the highest political end" — not necessarily the highest
end on everyone's personal scale of values.
Vallier, in an attempt to pre-empt Rothbard, recognizes:
This view is a manifestation of thin libertarianism, which is probably
still the dominant position in the liberty movement. The father of this
approach was Murray Rothbard, who across his massive corpus of theory and
commentary never penned a single piece developing a systematic libertarian
approach to religion in public life. He may not have thought it necessary.
I have no idea if Rothbard ever did or didn’t address this
issue. However, for a libertarian as a
libertarian, this isn’t necessary. Vallier recognizes the thin libertarian view
as being at the root of why this is not addressed.
What is thin libertarianism?
“Thin” is a redundant qualifier: thin libertarianism is limited to nothing
more than libertarianism – recognition of the non-aggression principle, with
the inherent respect for private property rights.
This in contrast to thick libertarianism – a
term which is undefinable, and therefore an attempt, whether willful or
not, to render the term “libertarian” meaningless. Suffice it to say: thin libertarians do not
recognize thick libertarian positions as libertarian, no matter the possible personal
agreement on certain of these positions.
Returning to Vallier:
The weakness of the libertarian
approach is that it confuses politics and the state. Libertarians frequently
forget that any free society is going to have both political disputes and
deeply religious citizens.
A free society is also going to have devoted adherents to
fantasy football. Must libertarians
comment on this for libertarian
theory to be considered valid or whole?
In any case, I have not seen evidence of this
confusion. Libertarians don’t forget
such things as the possibility of religious citizens; the reality is that such things
are not relevant to libertarian theory.
Politics and religion are not going
away even if the state is abolished.
It would be helpful to see some evidence of libertarians –
specifically Rothbard, as Vallier introduced him into the discussion – claiming
that this would be so; I will guess that none will be found. Libertarian theory is concerned directly with
the issue of politics: when is force justified?
As to religion, there are a few loud-mouths who blame the problems of
the world on religion; but are wacky comments on libertarian-oriented message boards
now to become the standard of libertarian scholarship?
Vallier eventually approaches a necessary reality – the
issue of something more being necessary for a society to survive (or at least an
issue for the possibility of a society to thrive):
And the role of religion in
politics directly affects how any political process respects or violates
liberty. If we are to ever have a libertarian society, we must find a way to
speak to these conflicts.
Vallier approaches this reality, but misses the mark; he criticizes
libertarians for not holding or expanding upon views that have nothing to do
with libertarian theory. One might as
well criticize libertarians for not holding a view on the Real Madrid –
Barcelona rivalry.
Rothbard states (paraphrasing): libertarianism does not
answer every question. Libertarianism does
not provide every answer for the development of a thriving – and perhaps not
even surviving – society. Something more
is necessary – call it culture, call it world-view, call it religion. As Gary North often writes, people want to
know what it is that other people around here (wherever your chosen “here” is) believe.
I have written often on this necessary idea of “more,” for
example here
and here. But these are questions outside of
libertarian theory. The non-aggression
principle, libertarians believe, is the foundation. It is nothing more.
For Vallier to take libertarians (and specifically Rothbard)
to task for avoiding a subject that is outside of libertarian theory is
illogical. It presupposes that “thick”
is the only acceptable position for a libertarian to hold, and that thick positions
must be included within the sphere of libertarian theory.
This is nonsense; it is also dangerous. It serves to ensure that there will be less
room in the tent for those interested in the libertarian position.
Why?
It's interesting to see the struggle we have in changing from focusing on the specifics to focusing on the foundational. I'm new to libertarianism, but for me it seems that it presents a foundational principle, namely the NAP, and then draws conclusions from how that principle applies to a specific situation. It becomes an exercise in connect-the-dots. It's obvious that a single principle isn't going to cover every situation, but the vast implications of such a principle are less obvious. I'm amazed at the number of people that get caught up in arguing the specifics without connecting it back to a foundational principle. I think this is why we allow the government so much power, or even why we have "government" at all. It seems that Vallier is focusing on specifics that the NAP doesn't cover in order to discredit the wide reaching implications.
ReplyDelete