Posts
I have been asked to provide comment to a series of posts by
Walter Block at the LRC blog. From part
I and the issue – the topic under discussion:
If the Martians threaten to blow up
our entire planet unless someone kills innocent person Joe, it is murder to do
so, but it would not be wrong to murder him, paradoxically, saving all others
except for him.
Normally I don’t involve myself in such discussions; I am
much more focused on finding liberty and not purifying libertarian theory
beyond the point that is meaningful to life.
It seems to me that we have achieved the point where culture and
tradition will decide such things, not application of theory.
Having said this, I am very glad that I read the posts. Buried in these was a real gem by Walter. From part
IV, the reframing of the NAP:
A more sophisticated understanding
of libertarianism does not say, with the NAP: “Thou shalt not murder, initiate
violence against innocent persons or their legitimate possessions.” Rather, it
states, that if you do, you will be punished in accordance with libertarian
punishment theory.
Hans Hoppe raised
a similar point a year ago (at least that’s when I first internalized the idea),
when he cited a portion of the Decalogue as foundational to liberty, granting
that this suggested nothing about punishment for the various transgressions:
However, the ten commandments do
not say anything about the severity and suitable punishment of
violations of its various commands. They proscribe all mentioned activities and
desires, but they leave open the question of how severely any of them deserves
to be punished.
Daniel Ajamian incorporated this idea at
AERC last March, crediting Hoppe for the insight and paraphrasing Hoppe’s point:
The question for the libertarian as
libertarian: does the violation rise to the point of requiring formal, physical
punishment?
Now, Walter has offered and extended the same point. Perhaps others have made the point as well; I
am only offering when and where I have come across it. But this point sits quite well with me, as it
removes the impossibility of trying to fit the square peg of the NAP into the
round hole of a complete moral code, instead limiting it to the role of strictly
identifying when punishment is justified, to include – of course – when
violence in defense is justified.
This, to me, is the most important point to come out of this
series of posts by Walter. I do not want
to let it pass lightly. This is a more
sophisticated understanding of the NAP – as a guideline for when punishment is
justified, not merely “don’t hit first, don’t take my stuff.”
But what of the discussion that brought this on, and, I
suspect, the reason I was asked to provide comment? Walter has entitled the series “Murder Is
Always A Violation of the NAP, But It Is Not Always Wrong.”
In the example given, I agree that murdering Joe is a
violation of the NAP – and such a murder is deserving of physical
punishment. But what of the second part
of Walter’s statement – that it is not always wrong? The answer to this really depends on where
and how one finds the line dividing right from wrong. If one finds that line solely in the NAP,
then it is wrong.
Walter suggests that the line is elsewhere, as he does not
see that a violation of the NAP is always “wrong.” For this, one must ask: on what do you base
your moral code? (I have made my
argument for natural law here.)
The answer to this question will not be found in the NAP,
unless one limits his moral code to this (as I have often argued, this thin
moral code is not sufficient for liberty).
But it need not be found in the NAP if one views the NAP solely for the
purpose of justifiable punishment or self-defense – as Walter has reframed the
purpose of the principle.
In fact, to frame this question as an issue for the NAP to
resolve (as if the NAP offered a complete moral code) only degrades and
cheapens the NAP in the eyes of many. For
example, take Walter’s “Defending the Undefendable” series. If one reads these as NAP-approved moral
behaviors, one would rightly say “libertarianism is not for me.” But if one reads these as issues to be
considered for punishment, then an entirely new world opens up – not
inconsistent with the example of Jesus and the adulteress in the Gospel of John. The way Walter has reframed it opens the door
for the latter, closing it on the former.
So, to answer if it is wrong fully depends on the societal
moral code. Walter does not find it
wrong. I, personally, find it wrong for
many reasons – not the least of which: I find it inconsistent with natural
law. Further, I would never trust
someone who made such a demand to be ethical enough to keep his end of the
bargain. But further still, this is like
being asked by a thug which one of your children he should kill; for me, he
will get no help in doing his dirty deed – I will not be a party to such a
crime. The thug will kill the other
child, leaving the parent with explaining to the one left alive why he chose
her to die.
But a better argument is from Infinity
Wars:
One of the Infinity Stones is in
Vision’s head. But when he suggests that Scarlet Witch destroy it, and likely
kill him in the process, Captain America says, “We don’t trade lives.”
Now, based on the outcome of that story, maybe Walter is
right. Thanos ended up getting the stone
anyway and using it to destroy half of all life in the universe – close enough
to Walter’s example. Then again, by
sticking to this moral code, the Avengers were able to trust each other enough
and regroup, coming out victorious in Endgame.
But me? Actually,
there is an even better argument, from a much better source: Jesus told the
parable of the shepherd leaving the ninety-nine sheep to save the one. Every life is precious, and I have no reason
to make a deal with anyone – Martian or otherwise – holding such a price over
my head.
To be clear: both Walter and I are answering this question
not as libertarian theoreticians or philosophers, but ethical philosophers. So, take my comments with several grains of
salt. Unfortunately, this is the field
in which the question must be answered.
Conclusion
Back to what I found most important in this conversation:
reframing the NAP as a guideline for justifiable punishment cleans up so many
unnecessary arguments about the NAP, removes so many unnecessary burdens from
the NAP, eliminates from the NAP a need to carry a yoke beyond its limits.
Both Walter and Hans have offered this point. They are easily two of the top five
libertarian thinkers alive in the world today (and don’t ask me for my
list). Such a reframing would contribute
greatly toward a more sophisticated understanding of what it takes to form a
society that would move toward liberty.
And, ultimately, isn’t that the objective?
