No, this isn’t your standard, run-of-the-mill heresy. And unlike my normal practice, regarding this
heresy and this theology I will allow comments and dialogue.
Against
Libertarian Legalism: A Comment on Kinsella and Block, by Frank Van Dun
(FVD)
What follows is a comment on some
of the arguments on intellectual property and blackmail presented respectively
by N. Stephan Kinsella and Walter Block….
I understand fairly well the arguments of Kinsella and Block
on these topics, but this is in any case secondary to FVD’s purpose:
After all, etching in the fine
points of libertarian jurisprudence on blackmail or intellectual property is
hardly a pressing need.
So why is FVD writing this paper
and why am I writing about what FVD is writing about?
Rather, I believe
my disagreement on those small matters critically involves the very basis on which
Block and Kinsella chose to erect their legal arguments. I am referring to
their use of the so-called Rothbardian non-aggression rule as the foundation or
axiom for libertarian jurisprudence.
Heresy. Hilaire Belloc defines heresy as follows:
Heresy is the
dislocation of some complete and self-supporting scheme by the introduction of
a novel denial of some essential part therein.
The question we will explore: which
party is doing “the dislocation of some complete and self-supporting scheme by
the introduction of a novel denial of some essential part therein”?
You can surmise from the following
the view of FVD on this question:
The purpose of my
comments is to explain why I think that this axiom is inadequate from a
libertarian point of view…. I shall endeavour to show briefly where the so-called
non-aggression axiom fits in a libertarian philosophy of law.
FVD describes many of the same
struggles I have with considering the most restrictive definition of the
non-aggression principle (and you will forgive my shortcut): it considers only
life and property; contracts are valid only when they involve title transfer;
physical property is the only type of property; relationships are defined only via
what is explicitly considered in a contract.
I will let FVD explain it:
I shall argue that,
if pressed to their logical conclusion, [Kinsella’s arguments against the
legitimacy of trademark protection] would make the very idea of a contractual
order and therefore of a free market incoherent.
It is my
contention that [Block’s arguments concerning libel and labour contracts] lead
to results that are incompatible with the requirements of freedom and justice
that define the libertarian perspective on human relations…. It seems to legitimize
only a world in which every possible contingency must be covered by an explicit
contractual stipulation.
The whole of FVD’s argument can be
summarized as follows:
My differences
with Kinsella and Block stem from the fact that it does not follow from those
theses that defensive use of force is justified or lawful only in response to aggressive
violent invasions of persons or property.