Bleeding Hearts: Thanks for Nothing

Recently I commented on the proposal posted at the Bleeding Heart Libertarians site regarding the advocacy of a Basic Income Guarantee (BIG).  To make a long story short, a proposal advocating a $10,000 per person income guarantee instead of the various federal welfare programs.  The Bleeding Hearts view this as a libertarian position.

Like clockwork, here comes Krugman, bashing the “libertarian” position on BIG:

…the currently trendy idea among libertarians that we can make things much better by replacing the welfare state with a basic guaranteed income. As Mike says, this notion rests on the belief that the welfare state is a crazily complicated mess of inefficient programs, and that simplification would save enough money to pay for universal grants that are neither means-tested nor conditional on misfortune.

Point, counterpoint – nothing is left but a political debate of inconsequential details.  This is the nonsense to which the Bleeding Hearts and pragmatic libertarians expose the philosophy.

Guess who is complaining about Krugman’s attack?  None other than one of the cornerstones of the Bleeding Hearts, Matt Zwolinski:

A few days ago, Paul Krugman displayed his masterful knowledge of the sociology of the libertarian movement by complaining about all the Ayn Randians running around advocating for a Basic Income Guarantee.

Matt, if you don’t want Krugman to be confused about Libertarianism, perhaps you should stop confusing him.

Or stop pretending that you had nothing to do with it.

The Rise and Decline of the State

With this post, I begin a review of the book by Martin Van Creveld: “The Rise and Decline of the State.”  Best to start with his opening statement in the Preface:

The state, which since the middle of the seventeenth century has been the most important and most characteristics of all modern institutions, is in decline.

Plenty of bloggers like me make such outlandish statements; so, who is Martin Van Creveld?

Van Creveld was born in the Netherlands in the city of Rotterdam to a Jewish family.  His parents, Leon and Margaret, were staunch Zionists who had managed to evade the Nazis during World War II.  One of Creveld's uncles and several cousins were killed in the Holocaust.  In 1950, the family immigrated to Israel, and Creveld grew up in Ramat Gan.  He was drafted to the Israel Defense Forces and served in logistics, but was soon granted an early discharge for medical reasons due to his cleft palate.  From 1964 to 1969, he studied history at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and earned an MA.  From 1969 to 1971, he studied history at the London School of Economics and received a PhD.  His doctoral dissertation on Hitler's strategy in the Balkans during the early years of World War II was later published into a book. After completing his PhD in 1971, van Creveld returned to Israel and began teaching at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.  He became a professor in 1988. In 2007, he retired from teaching at Hebrew University, and began teaching at Tel Aviv University's Security Studies Program.

Two of his books are required reading for United States Army officers (The Transformation of War and Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton); there are only two other books written by non-American authors on the required reading list – the well-known books by Sun Tzu and Clausewitz, respectively.  Not bad company.

Van Creveld has interesting views on current affairs:

In a TV interview in 2002, he expressed doubts as to the ability of the Israeli army to defeat the Palestinians:

They [Israeli soldiers] are very brave people... they are idealists... they want to serve their country and they want to prove themselves. The problem is that you cannot prove yourself against someone who is much weaker than yourself. They are in a lose-lose situation. If you are strong and fighting the weak, then if you kill your opponent then you are a scoundrel... if you let him kill you, then you are an idiot….Now the Israeli army has not by any means been the worst of the lot. It has not done what for instance the Americans did in Vietnam... it did not use napalm, it did not kill millions of people. So everything is relative, but by definition, to return to what I said earlier, if you are strong and you are fighting the weak, then anything you do is criminal.

On a less comforting note:

In a September 2003 interview in Elsevier, a Dutch weekly, on Israel and the dangers it faces from Iran, the Palestinians and world opinion van Creveld stated:

We possess several hundred atomic warheads and rockets and can launch them at targets in all directions, perhaps even at Rome. Most European capitals are targets for our air force…. We have the capability to take the world down with us. And I can assure you that that will happen before Israel goes under.

A frank assessment in a world gone MAD:

In the 21 August 2004 edition of the International Herald Tribune van Creveld wrote, "Had the Iranians not tried to build nuclear weapons, they would be crazy."

Van Creveld has stated that the Israeli government has "vastly exaggerated the threat that a nuclear Iran poses to its security, as well as Israel's capacity to halt it."

And a comment that moves him high on my list:

In 2005, van Creveld made headlines when he said in an interview that the 2003 invasion of Iraq was "the most foolish war since Emperor Augustus in 9 BC [sic] sent his legions into Germany and lost them", a reference to the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest.  His analysis included harsh criticism of the Bush Administration, comparing the war to the Vietnam war.  Moreover, he said that "Bush deserves to be impeached and, once he has been removed from office, put on trial."

So much for the author; returning to this book:

From Western Europe to Africa, either voluntarily or involuntarily, many existing states are either combining into larger communities or falling apart…Regardless of whether they fall apart or combine, already now many of their functions are being taken over by a variety of organizations which, whatever their precise nature, are not states.

The Dawn of Decadence

I return to “From Dawn to Decadence” by Jacques Barzun.  As a brief introduction for those who did not see my earlier post:

Over seven decades, Barzun wrote and edited more than forty books touching on an unusually broad range of subjects, including science and medicine, psychiatry from Robert Burton through William James to modern methods, and art, and classical music; he was one of the all-time authorities on Hector Berlioz.

At 84 years of age, he began writing his swan song, to which he devoted the better part of the 1990s. The resulting book of more than 800 pages, From Dawn to Decadence: 500 Years of Western Cultural Life, 1500 to the Present, reveals a vast erudition and brilliance undimmed by advanced age. Historians, literary critics, and popular reviewers all lauded From Dawn to Decadence as a sweeping and powerful survey of modern Western history…

Introduction

In the prologue, Barzun offers his summary view and objective for the book:

By tracing in broad outline the evolution of art, science, religion, philosophy, and social thought during the last 500 years, I hope to show that during this span the peoples of the West offered the world a set of ideas and institutions not found earlier or elsewhere.

… [the west] has pursued characteristic purposes – that is its unity – and now these purposes, carried out to their utmost possibility, are bringing about its demise.

What is this demise, this decadence?

All that is meant by Decadence is “falling off.”  It implies in those who live in such a time no loss of energy or talent or moral sense.  On the contrary, it is a very active time, full of deep concerns, but peculiarly restless, for it sees no clear line of advance.  The loss it faces is that of Possibility.

The Beginning of the End

Barzun spends some 650 pages providing a thorough overview of western culture and civilization; to examine this in detail is well outside of the scope of this blog.  Barzun expertly demonstrates the wealth of the west – in both economic and cultural terms.  Many of the most significant individuals are reviewed – very few from the ranks of politics!  Then he comes to the beginning of the end:

The blow that hurled the modern world on its course of self-destruction was the Great War of 1914-18.

Much has been said about the causes of the Great War, and all the chief actors in the feverish August days – nations and individuals both – have been accused of making it inevitable.  No conclusion has been agreed upon because no action can be held to have been decisive by itself.  The most that can be charged against any officials is that the Austrian Minister Konrad von Hetzendorf wanted a war and that Sir Edward Grey in the Foreign Office vacillated before announcing that Britain would side with France.  All the other diplomats and heads of state worked hard to avert the catastrophe.

A war of the west in destruction of the west; this much is certain.

Shaw and the Fabians

What led to this Great War?  Barzun offers as prologue to the war the cheap daily paper, “in which raucous propaganda, crime, and scandal were the main fare, but not the only attraction.”  As an example, the work done by Hearst to drive popular opinion in America for the Spanish-American War.

In addition, many periodicals were introduced or gained influence:

The Saturday Review, The New Age, The New Statesman, The Spectator in England, The Nation, The New Republic in the United States.

There were various other publications written by one or another individual or small group of like-minded individuals.  “The most unified and best organized were the Fabians.  And among them the most untiring and resourceful propagandist was Shaw.”

George Bernard Shaw (26 July 1856 – 2 November 1950) was an Irish playwright and a co-founder of the London School of Economics.

He was most angered by what he perceived as the exploitation of the working class. An ardent socialist, Shaw wrote many brochures and speeches for the Fabian Society. He became an accomplished orator in the furtherance of its causes, which included gaining equal rights for men and women, alleviating abuses of the working class, rescinding private ownership of productive land, and promoting healthy lifestyles.

Libertarians, Thick and BIG

Matt Zwolinski is out with his bleeding-heart argument, not only thick but BIG, as in Basic Income Guarantee: “The Pragmatic Libertarian Case for a Basic Income Guarantee.”

In what follows, I will make the case for a Basic Income Guarantee (BIG) as a replacement for the current welfare state. There are a number of distinct ways of arguing from libertarian premises to a BIG, some of which I have discussed in the past.

Arguing from “libertarian premises” for a BIG; I look forward to a reasoned application of the non-aggression principle and property rights, being, you know, pretty important “libertarian premises.”  Pretty important, as in there is no such thing as “libertarian” without these premises.

I will focus on what I take to be the strongest and most persuasive libertarian argument.

That’s good, because I don’t want to waste time on the weakest and least persuasive arguments.

I will argue that a BIG, even if it is not ideal from a libertarian perspective, is significantly better on libertarian grounds than our current welfare state, and has a much higher likelihood of being achieved in a world in which most people reject libertarian views.

I might see how BIG might be better on conservative grounds, or make-government-more-efficient grounds, or I-want-to-be-accepted-at-Cato grounds, or acceptable-dialectic grounds…but libertarian grounds?  This should be interesting.

Matt proposes a $10,000 per year, unconditional cash grant to every American citizen over 21 years of age.  He then lists “four reasons why libertarians should support a BIG over the current American welfare state.”  He then closes “with some reflections on libertarian ideals and political compromise.”

Let’s see if he can do this half as well as Rothbard has regarding libertarian ideals and political compromise.

No libertarian would wish for a BIG as an addition to the currently existing welfare state.

That’s a relief.  So far, so good.

But what about as a replacement for it?

This might be a fiscal conservative’s argument for it (a naïve fiscal conservative, but a fiscal conservative nonetheless), but a libertarian’s argument?  Come on Matt, convince me.

Such a revolutionary overhaul of the welfare state would almost certainly require a constitutional amendment, both to insulate debate somewhat from the pleas and protests of special interests, and to make it considerably more difficult to renege on the deal afterwards.

Does the naïveté have to be revealed so early?  Matt, please do an analysis of current government actions relative to the insulation that the Constitution provides (I’m looking for the Constitutional provision that requires me to buy health insurance, for example), and then get back to us. 

So now to the four reasons:

Less Bureaucracy

Every one of the more than 126 federal welfare programs comes with its own bureaucracy, its own set of arcane rules, regulations, and restrictions, and its own significant (and rising) overhead costs. A BIG, in contrast, requires significantly less in terms of administrative expense. A program in which everyone gets a check for the same amount is simple enough to be administered by a computer program.

Matt, do you have any idea about how government bureaucracies work?  You are going to strangle a few hundred thousand employees and dozens of departments and 126 programs?  Really?  Reagan couldn’t even close the Department of Education – only a few years old when he said he would do it.  If you succeed at this dream, it will be the first time government has grown smaller (except for immediately after a war…temporarily) ever. 

Cheaper

Second, a BIG could be considerably cheaper than the current welfare state. How much cheaper depends on the details of the particular proposal. Some, like Murray’s, which involve a progressive tax on the BIG once a certain threshold of income is reached, appear to be considerably cheaper. Other analyses, like Ed Dolan’s, suggest only that a moderate BIG would not cost more than what we currently spend.

It “could” be cheaper, but it also could not be cheaper.  Do you really believe any scheme will result in the government spending less?  If the math says it is cheaper, you don’t think constituents will pound the doors to make the benefits bigger?  Or keep those government employees on the payroll, or lower the eligibility age, or give an additional amount per dependent, or something?

How many years has Cato been working on rolling back federal government spending?  Please point to a tangible success – one measured in dollars and cents.

Truman Knew

From Hiroshima’s Shadow; this post is based on the contribution by Robert L. Messer, entitled “New Evidence on Truman’s Decision.”

Once again we mark the anniversary of one of the more horrific events of a horrific war, the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, and, subsequently, Nagasaki.  Before I come to the specific topic of what President Truman knew and when he knew it regarding the position of the Japanese toward surrender and / or imminent defeat (without invasion), I suggest it is worth considering this first-hand account, from the ground at Hiroshima, of that terrible day; as a reminder of context, this is necessary.

Messer points to information discovered when Truman’s private journals and letters became public:

The first batch of this new evidence on the bomb decision surfaced in 1979.  It had been misfiled among the family records of Truman’s press secretary at the Truman presidential library.

Four years after the discovery of Truman’s Potsdam diary a second batch of new evidence of Truman’s contemporary thinking on matters relating to the use of the bomb turned up among his widows private papers.

The declassification of government documents and presidential papers, and the release of privately held manuscript sources such as Stimson’s private diary forced a revision if not total refutation of accepted orthodoxy.

From this evidence, Messer concludes that “Truman had already concluded that Japan was about to capitulate.”  No bomb necessary.

Truman was not in the dark regarding the power of the bomb, as he noted: “the most terrible bomb in the history of the world.”  He recognized that technology was moving faster that morals: “I hope for some sort of peace – but I fear that machines are ahead of morals by some centuries and when morals catch up perhaps there’ll be no reason for any of it.”

So, Truman knew he was making an immoral decision.

He knew quite well Stalin’s commitment to enter the war against Japan three months after the defeat of Germany: “He’ll [Stalin] be in Jap War on August 15^th…. Fini Japs when that comes about.”

From Potsdam: “I’ve gotten what I came for – Stalin goes to war on August 15 with no strings on it…. I’ll say that we’ll end the war a year sooner now, and think of the kids who won’t be killed.”

The war would end with Soviet entry by August 15 according to Truman, less than ten days after the bomb was unnecessarily (for this purpose) exploded over Hiroshima.

With such sentiments, you would think Truman would explore every possible avenue to avoid unleashing this hell.  Needless to say, you would be wrong.

He was the only person who had the final say – not only on whether the bomb would be used at all, but when and how it would be used.

Like maybe over some uninhabited island over the Pacific, as a show of force?

“[I] believe Japs will fold up before Russia comes in.  I am sure that will when Manhattan appears over their homeland.”

Why drop the bomb on August 6 if the end was at hand just a few days later?

As Messer notes: “The bomb would shorten the war by days rather than months.”

Others have concluded, on solid basis, that the war could have ended months before the dropping of the bomb – Japan was ready to surrender and had been making many overtures through several channels to this effect.  The primary hindrance was the insistence by the United States government (first Roosevelt, then Truman) of unconditional surrender, including the dethroning of the emperor.  A secondary hindrance might very well have been the desire to use the bomb.

Less than one year after the end of the war, the US Strategic Bombing Survey’s official report on the Pacific War appeared.  The authors concluded that…

“the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombs did not defeat Japan….certainly prior to December 31, 1945 and in all probability prior to November 1, 1945 Japan would have surrendered, even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.” (emphasis added)

Truman’s response to this report?  He put Stimson to work to set the record straight (meaning, establish the desired narrative).  Much of the propaganda associated with the official narrative can be traced to Stimson’s efforts, as documented by McGeorge Bundy.

It shouldn’t be left unsaid: Hiroshima (and Nagasaki) should not be looked at in a vacuum; these atrocities were merely continuation of the precedents set in Hamburg, Dresden, and Tokyo – the firebombing of civilian populations, with little or no military relevance. 

What is different?  Hiroshima and Nagasaki stand out as a symbol – a mushroom cloud; the inevitable use of the newest weapon:

Imagine a time when it all began

In the dying days of a war

A weapon that would settle the score

Whoever found it first would be sure to do their worst

They always had before...

The Palestinian Ghetto

Following are some comments and observations I have gathered from various sources regarding ghetto life.  It is not a pretty picture. 

I have not attempted to organize the comments in any meaningful narrative.  Each one stands alone.

I will add no further comment, other than the citing of the sources at the end of the post.

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…when all hope for survival was abandoned, the ghetto underground staged an uprising…several hundred…began an armed insurrection against the troops… (1)

…the area was completely cut off from the outside world: no food was allowed in, rubbish and waste were not collected, the dead lay on the streets and piled up in the bombed-out store fronts and the buildings were overcrowded, leading to the spread of diseases… (2)

It was created for the purpose of exploitation, terror, and persecution… (3)

Before the…invasion, [it] was an influential centre for [those] who had lived there… (3)

Only four guarded entrances allowed traffic to pass through. (3)

Young people…joined forces…to…organize resistance in the ghetto….  The group carried out a variety of resistance activities including…bombing…. (3)

It was an area of small primitive houses and no running water… (4)

The ghetto had two parts…. Each ghetto was enclosed by barbed wire and closely guarded. Both were overcrowded, with each person allocated less than ten square feet of living space. (4)

…they razed the ghetto to the ground with grenades and dynamite. (4)

The…ghetto had several…resistance groups. The resistance acquired arms, developed secret training areas in the ghetto… (4)

[Authorities] called for the final liquidation of the ghetto… (5)

The…propaganda blamed the killings on the [local commissioners]… (6)

Although [some] had also been among the victims of the massacre…they were collectively accused as a group…of having somehow been responsible for it. (6)

Internal passports were used to control the population, being necessary, for example, to obtain a medical prescription. (7)

Access to and from the ghetto could only be made through the police yard. People exiting or entering the ghetto were searched here and often beaten up. (7)

…the…ghettos had an internal government…. [W]hile some members of the Council tried to improve things… [the internal government] was a fiction, created to help the…annihilation of the…population…. (7)

Legally, food could only be purchased from shops within the ghetto, and only with ration books. What food was available was of poor quality. (7)

People working outside the ghetto tried to get food and bring into the ghetto, but it was extremely difficult to get it past the police checkpoint at the ghetto entrance. (7)

The housing problem in the ghetto was severe. Many houses had no electricity, plumbing, gas, or central heating. (7)

…there was only a single out-patient clinic available for medical care… (7)

The people were also under extreme psychological pressure and there were suicides. (7)

Some buildings in the ghetto had interior plumbing, however this failed during cold weather. (7)

The…authorities established a prison in the…ghetto….  Many were never seen again after being taken to the ghetto prison. (7)

Over the course of the summer…troops…killed more than 21,000…in a mass extermination program. (8)

The…[resistance]…was formed…in the…Ghetto. It took for its motto "We will not go like sheep to the slaughter" (8)

The goals of the [resistance] were to establish a means for the self-defence of the ghetto population, to sabotage…industrial and military activities… (8)

Unemployment was a major problem in the ghetto. Illegal workshops were created to manufacture goods to be sold illegally on the outside and raw goods were smuggled in… (9)

Smuggling was often the only source of subsistence for Ghetto inhabitants, who would otherwise have died of starvation. (9)

Over 100,000 of the Ghetto's residents died due to rampant disease or starvation, as well as random killings… (9)

The first instances of…armed resistance began that day. (9)

-----------------------------------------------

1)      Białystok Ghetto

2)      Budapest Ghetto

3)      Kraków Ghetto

4)      Kovno Ghetto

5)      Łódź Ghetto

6)      Lwów Ghetto

7)      Riga Ghetto

8)      Vilna Ghetto

9)      Warsaw Ghetto

US Offers Complete Support for Russian Territorial Demands in Europe

Yes, you read that correctly.  No, it isn’t breaking news; this news is 70 years old.  It has nothing to do with Putin and the Ukraine; it refers to Stalin and half of Europe. 

But the events from each time offer an interesting story.  Take a moment (and for a rational mind, it won’t take even a moment) to understand the differences between Putin and Stalin….

The desired narrative: Putin is a crazed madman, hell-bent on re-establishing the Soviet Empire.  Uncle Joe, however, merely wanted to bring his version of democracy to all of Europe. 

The reality: Putin has, what, a relative handful of deaths on his hands?  Stalin?  Tens of millions.  Putin gets kicked out of the G-8.  Stalin receives FDR’s blessing as the first American president to officially recognize the Soviet Union.  Putin receives the scorn of the current regime in Washington.  Stalin?  Well, let’s allow Robert Nisbet tell the story, from his book “Roosevelt and Stalin: The Failed Courtship.”

Roosevelt, of course, made many concessions to Stalin during the war; I will not focus on the early years, but begin with Yalta – in February, 1945.  By this point, the war in Europe was nearing an end and Americans were moving successfully across the Pacific toward Japan.  Certainly, the worst attributes of Stalin and the Soviets were clear to Roosevelt and the administration.

In other words, by this point there was no need (as if there ever was one) for further favors to be passed the Soviets’ way; there was no excuse (as if there ever was one) for claiming ignorance of the unfathomable murder that coursed through Stalin’s veins.

Yalta did not hand Eastern Europe to Stalin – he already occupied or would soon occupy much of this, as privately agreed with Roosevelt in Tehran in November 1943.  This private agreement was given concrete form by Roosevelt’s continuing insistence that the Allies not proceed into Central Europe via the Mediterranean to head off the Soviets (as Churchill would have preferred).  Stalin wanted only an assault from the west against the Germans; Roosevelt ensured this would be the focus.

Yalta offered something to Stalin that he could never achieve on his own:

I have just stressed that Yalta is not the source of the Soviet possessions in eastern Europe; that Teheran is.  But Yalta performed a service to the Soviets that was almost as important to Stalin as the occupied areas themselves.  This was the invaluable service of giving moral legitimation to what Stalin had acquired by sheer force. (P. 70)

As Chester Wilmot wrote in his The Struggle for Europe, “the real issue was not what Stalin would or could have taken but what he was given the right to do.” (P. 71)

That Roosevelt did not agree to send the Allied military into central Europe through the Mediterranean and stop Stalin from taking even more territory is one thing; to legitimize the dark night over Eastern Europe is quite another.

…not only did power over the Baltic and Balkan peoples pass to Stalin; these people had to watch what democracy and freedom they had known before the war disappear, and then suffer the added humiliation of seeing such words as “free elections,” “sovereignty,” “democracy,” “independence,” and “liberation” deliberately corrupted, debased, made duplicitous…. (P. 71)

Kind of like the elections in Crimea. 

After one of the plenary sessions at Yalta, Roosevelt wrote privately to Stalin regarding the Polish government-in-exile in London:

“The United States will never lend its support in any way to any provisional government in Poland that would be inimical to your interests.” (P. 72)

Yalta removed the post-war possibility of the Americans stating to Stalin “Get out.”  Imagine: the United States government legitimized a massive land-grab by one of the two worst murderers of the 20^th century.