The Federal Reserve recently released transcripts of its
meetings in 2007. This was during the
time of the first visible signs of the ongoing financial calamity. I say the first visible signs, because there
were a few economists and investors who understood this issue well before 2007,
most of these students of the Austrian Business Cycle Theory.
But none were to be found at the Fed. The New York Daily News summarizes the
transcripts:
They
didn't see it coming.
Federal Reserve officials were largely blindsided as the
financial crisis hurtled toward the U.S. economy like a freight train in 2007,
according to newly released transcripts. [1]
The Wall Street Journal is slightly less blunt:
Federal Reserve officials in 2007
appeared to underestimate the sickly condition of U.S. financial markets before
shifting to a state of growing alarm,
according to 1,566 pages of newly released transcripts from the central bank's
meetings that year.
During most of the year, Fed
Chairman Ben Bernanke embraced only reluctantly the
interventionist stance that has defined his stewardship of the
central bank. [2]
Yes, Bernanke really didn’t want to intervene. The markets made him do it.
I am quite certain Bernanke’s reluctance was never a concern
to those who placed him at the helm.
They knew he was “Helicopter Ben,” and they knew where his instincts
would lead him when the time was right.
The whirlwind that hit the global
economy in late 2008 outstripped even the direst
forecasts in the transcripts. The new record provides
ammunition for the Fed's critics—both those who say it was too slow to act and
those who say it was too aggressive in intervening in financial markets. [2]
It gives the most ammunition to those who say the Fed
shouldn’t even exist. There is no
economically rational argument for central planning of any commodity (meaning
any good or service); why is this ignored when it comes to the most important commodity
in a sophisticated division-of-labor economy?
The Washington Post chimes in:
It was December 2007, and officials
at the Federal Reserve were torn between two visions of what was in store for
the nation’s economy: a mild slowdown or outright recession.
I guess they didn’t consider a third possibility.
They opted to believe in a
slowdown. They were wrong. [3]
They weren’t just wrong in their choice; they were wrong by
limiting themselves to these two possibilities.
It seems they didn’t even consider the third possibility, and the one
that actually came to pass: the most severe economic catastrophe since the
Great Depression, one that has lasted for five years with few signs of abating,
and no signs of return to anything approaching pre-catastrophe levels.
A
staff presentation described a highly unlikely, worst-case scenario that
included a 10 percent drop in the stock market. [3]
They missed that forecast by just a bit, as the S&P 500
would fall more than 50%, from above 1500 in the summer of 2007 to below 700 by
March 2009.
The transcripts mention the word
“recession” four times in January, three times in June, once in August, and 27
times in December. [4]
According to the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER),
the recession began in December, 2007.
Good catch there by the Fed, to even begin to seriously discuss the
possibility of recession all the way back in…wait a minute, let me double-check
that…December, 2007. Way to look out
into the future and guide the ship. The best
macro-economists money can buy.
Central banking, like all macro-economic disciplines based
on math and formulas (as opposed to human action) is quackery, and these
transcripts demonstrate this unavoidable fact once again – as if we need more
evidence.
Here are some of the lowlights of the minutes, gleaned from
several sources that have reported on the subject: