Freedom Betrayed, by Herbert Hoover
Hoover summarizes “with remarkable candor and intensity”,
according to the editor, the revisionist indictment of the Roosevelt-Truman
foreign policy record. Again, in a
section not found in the main body of the work, Hoover here summarizes “A
Review of Lost Statesmanship – 19 Times in 7 Years.” Here, in language that does not appear in
Hoover’s intended version of his work, in addition to Roosevelt and Churchill, he
also lays blame squarely on Truman for his contributions to “lost
statesmanship,” not sparing Truman as he does elsewhere.
Any review of American and British
lost statesmanship in dealing with them [Hitler and Stalin], however, has no
excuse in history [for blaming only Hitler and Stalin]. Without these gigantic errors these
calamities could not have come to the Western world.
While spanning more than seven years, Hoover goes on to list
and explain these 19 lost opportunities, the first beginning shortly after
Roosevelt took office:
First…was [Roosevelt’s] destruction
of the 1933 World Economic Conference.
This conference was arranged by British Prime Minister MacDonald and
myself to take place in January, 1933.
As Roosevelt won the election, this conference was then
postponed until June.
At that time the world was just
beginning to recover from the world-wide depression but was engaged in bitter
currency wars and multiplying trade barriers.
The preliminary work had been done by experts. Roosevelt called ten Prime Ministers to
Washington with whom he agreed to restore the gold standard in international
transactions. Suddenly during the
Conference he repudiated (“the bombshell”) these undertakings and the
Conference cracked and died without accomplishment. His own Secretary of State Hull explicitly
denounced this action as the roots of World War II.
For more background on this conference, and “the bombshell,”
the following is from Wikipedia:
When the Conference opened on June
12, 1933, all attention rested on the tripartite currency discussions happening
outside the Conference. The big issue
was the exchange rate of the dollar against foreign currencies such as the
British pound and French franc. Many in
the U.S. favored devaluation of the dollar to improve the U.S. trade position;
France and Britain wanted to stabilize the dollar rate; i.e. fix it at a
relatively high value.
U.S. Secretary of State Cordell
Hull led the American delegation to the Conference. The President ordered Hull not to enter into
any discussions regarding currency stabilization. However by time the Conference gathered,
President Roosevelt had changed his mind, supporting currency manipulation to
raise prices, and had American banking experts Oliver Sprague and James Paul
Warburg conduct currency stabilization talks with their British and French
counterparts. By June 15, Sprague,
Warburg, Montagu Norman of the Bank of England, and Clement Moret of the Bank
of France had drafted a plan for temporary stabilization.
Word of this plan leaked out. The reaction in the U.S. was negative: the
dollar rose against foreign currencies, threatening U.S. exports, and stock and
commodity markets were depressed.
Although Roosevelt was considering
shifting his policy to a new median dollar-pound rate, he eventually decided
not to enter into any commitment, even a tentative one.
On June 17, fearing the British and
the French would seek to control their own exchange rates, Roosevelt rejected
the agreement, in spite of his negotiators’ pleas that the plan was only a
temporary device full of escape clauses.
On June 30, Roosevelt went further:
in an interview with four reporters, he openly criticized stabilization. Then on July 3, he issued a message to the
Conference condemning its efforts at stabilization when "broader
problems" existed, and asserting that the exchange rate of a nation's
currency was less important than other economic values.
Roosevelt’s rejection of the
agreement gathered an overwhelmingly negative response from the British, the
French, and internationalists in the United States. British Prime Minister Ramsay Macdonald
feared “Roosevelt’s actions would destroy the Conference” and Georges Bonnet,
rapporteur of the French Monetary Commission, is said to have “exploded.”
Critics see nationalism as a key
factor in Roosevelt’s decision. But John
Maynard Keynes hailed FDR's decision as "magnificently right", and
Irving Fisher wrote FDR that his message "makes me the happiest of
men."
Some form of stability in exchange rates was sought – and
the only reasonable method by which to stabilize rates is to link the subject
currencies to an accepted commodity, in this case (and as usual) gold. Setting aside the non-market forces that lie
behind a government managed gold-exchange standard, such a system offers at
least some form of mitigation for international imbalances. That Keynes and Fischer rejoiced at the
failure of this conference tells me that the world would have been better off
had the objectives of the conference been met.
This seems like a rather significant event – it is
identified by both Hoover and Hull as the event that triggered the coming World
War – yet to my recollection Hoover did not mention it at all in the “approved”
part of this volume. It only appears in
the appendix provided by the editor. Certainly,
as money is one side of every transaction in a modern economy, it would seem a
failure at settling open international issues toward this commodity would be
significant as regards the coming global catastrophe.
The second lost opportunity was Roosevelt’s recognition of
Communist Russia. Hoover saw this as
granting legitimacy to this movement, and opening the door for infiltrations
into the government of the United States.
Hoover claims that Roosevelt ignored the whole Communist infiltration
into his Administration, and ignored the entire international purpose of
Communism. Perhaps…or perhaps he didn’t
– purposely allowing the “infiltration” to exist and continue.
It would seem that Roosevelt from
all this five years of education, experience, might have realized both the
treachery and aggressive character of the Communists. But he brushed it aside – and he brushed
aside an even more malignant development…[t]he Communist infiltration into the
American Government.
The third was Munich.
Hoover does not condemn the transfer of Sudeten Germans to the Reich, as
he sees this as only correcting that which should not have been agreed to at
Versailles. Instead he sees the lost
statesmanship in not allowing this opening for Hitler to move against Russia to
continue to a more appropriate end.
Fourth, Hoover identifies the British and French guarantee
of Poland and Rumania in March, 1939. As previously documented, this guarantee
was provided with the strong, back-door encouragement of Roosevelt himself. This buried in cement the previous hands-off
approach of the allies in regards to the coming war between Hitler and Stalin.
It was probably the greatest
blunder in the whole history of European power diplomacy…. By their actions they not only protected
Stalin from Hitler but they enabled him to sell his influence to the highest
bidder.
Stalin’s price was the annexation of neighboring Baltic
States and East Poland. Chamberlain
could not agree to this immoral request.
Hitler was not so concerned with morality. Additionally, while Hitler still had his plan
of moving into Southeast Europe and also against Russia, he now had, in the
meantime, to deal with enemies in the west – enemies he would rather not have
dealt with in his desire for land and resources in the east.
The fifth major blunder was in the winter of 1941, when
Roosevelt threw the United States into undeclared war with Germany and Japan,
in violation of the promises he made in the run-up to his election just a few
weeks before.
Sixth was Lend-Lease.
By the time this was approved, Roosevelt already knew that Hitler was
going to turn his attention to Russia and therefore (according to Hoover) should
have limited his actions solely in basic aid to Britain, instead of the much
more direct and indirect confrontations of Germany.
Hoover describes the seventh as “the greatest loss of
statesmanship in all American history…”, that being the “tacit American
alliance and support of Communist Russia when Hitler made his attack in June,
1941.”
No greater opportunity for lasting
peace ever came to a President and he muffed it.
Of course, it is not plausible that Roosevelt simply
“muffed” this. Such horrendous mistakes
aren’t made. Whatever one thinks of
career bureaucrats, they are not stupid or unintelligent. This was not a “muff” but a deliberate choice
with a known outcome – but for a seemingly unexplainable reason.
It is coincident with this German attack on Russia that
Roosevelt significantly increased the pressure on Japan, as if coming to the
aid of Russia was of utmost significance to the President. Instead of seeing this as a way to allow two
tyrants to destroy each other, Roosevelt saw the need to come to the aid of an
“ally,” Russia.
The eighth gigantic error in
Roosevelt’s statesmanship was the total economic sanctions on Japan one month
later, at the end of July, 1941. The
sanctions were war in every essence except shooting. Roosevelt had been warned time and again by
his own officials that such provocation would sooner or later bring reprisals
of war.
Was this really one more “gigantic error”? Or did Roosevelt want war and therefore he
took actions knowing the likely (if not virtually certain) consequences.
The ninth was Roosevelt’s “contemptuous refusal of Prime
Minister Konoye’s proposals for peace” in September 1941. The acceptance of these proposals was
encouraged by both the American and British Ambassadors in Japan. The proposed terms would have achieved every
American objective with the possible exception of the return of Manchuria to
China – an item still to be left open to discussion.
William C. Bullitt was appointed American Ambassador to
Moscow in December, 1933. In July, 1935,
he reported to Roosevelt certain of his conclusions regarding the objectives of
the Communists, including:
It is of course the heartiest hope
of the Soviet Government that the United States will become involved in a war
with Japan….”
Such a war would pit the U.S. against Russia’s main rival
for dominance of the Far East. Just as
he did in Europe, it seems Roosevelt worked to make the Asian world safe for
Stalin. As one example of the benefits
to the Russians of this entry into war by the U.S., it should be recalled that
at the end of the war Manchuria was given to the Russians, even at a time when
Russian aid was knowingly not needed to end the war in the Pacific. The same outcome as could have been achieved
in 1941 before Pearl Harbor (assuming Japan insisted on keeping Manchuria as
part of the peace negotiations), without several million dead and millions more
wounded in the meantime.
The tenth was the refusal to accept the proposal by the
Emperor of Japan for a three month stand-still agreement in November 1941. U.S. military leaders strongly urged
Roosevelt to accept this; “Then Hull issued his foolish ultimatum, and we were
defeated at Pearl Harbor.”
It was only foolish if one considered peace to be the
objective. Roosevelt wanted war despite
clear indications that he could achieve most if not all of his stated
objectives via negotiations. Hull was
not foolish, and he certainly did not issue the ultimatum on his own authority.
The eleventh was Roosevelt’s demand for “Unconditional
Surrender” at Casablanca in January 1943.
It will be recalled that Roosevelt claimed he just said this
off-the-cuff. For an off-the-cuff
remark, it had horrendous consequences both for the Germans, and eventually the
Japanese. For an off-the-cuff remark, it
sure held sway on Truman.
The twelfth error of lost
statesmanship was the sacrifice of free nations at the foreign Ministers
meeting at Moscow, in October, 1943.
The thirteenth and possibly one of
the greatest of all confused wanderings in Roosevelt’s and Churchill’s
statesmanship was at Teheran in December, 1943.
Here was the confirmation of the acquiescence at the Moscow conference
of the annexations; here was the acceptance of Stalin’s doctrine of a periphery
“of friendly border states” – the puppet Communist governments over seven
nations.
The fourteenth fatal loss of
statesmanship was by Roosevelt and Churchill at Yalta in February, 1945. Not only were all Stalin’s encroachments on
the independence of a dozen nations ratified….
Of course, the fate of these nations was sealed once the
West teamed with Stalin. Certainly their
fate may not have been better under Hitler, but the outcome would have come
without the blessing of the United States, and in any case had the two tyrants
been allowed to so weaken each other, they likely would not have ended the war
in position to lord over these smaller regions in Central Europe and in the
Baltic. It is not plausible that these
were all errors or “confused wanderings.”
Such agreements don’t happen by mistake.
Roosevelt directly calls out Truman beginning with the
fifteenth lost opportunity, that being in May – June, 1945, with Truman’s
refusal to “take notice of the Japanese white flags.” As mentioned earlier, Truman was certainly
not bound by Roosevelt’s call for “Unconditional Surrender,” and it has been
shown elsewhere that even Truman had opportunities to redefine this in such a
way that the Emperor could retain his position – a desire even of the U.S.
military, as they viewed this as a necessary condition for Japanese soldiers to
voluntarily stand down.
The sixteenth was at Potsdam:
The wickedness of slavery of war
prisoners, the expelling of whole peoples from their homes was ratified and
amplified from Yalta.
Beyond all this, against advice
from leading men, the ultimatum was issued to Japan of unconditional surrender
without the saving clause allowing them to retain the Mikado recommended by a
score of experienced American voices.
The Japanese, in reply, asked only for this concession, which was met
with the atomic bomb – and then conceded in the end.
Hoover describes this as a conference where “[p]ower had now
passed to inexperienced men in the democratic countries and the Communists had
their way at every consequential point.”
This is a faulty conclusion on Hoover’s part. He has spent much of this book providing
solid examples of the failures of the previous, apparently “experienced”
statesman from the West – the first fourteen items on his list provide such
examples. He takes Roosevelt and
Churchill to task on their countless occasions of allowing the Communists to
have “their way at every consequential point.”
These first fourteen points were no less egregious than those
attributable to Truman, yet somehow the failure is blamed on
“inexperience.” It is not so; it was not
a failure. It was a decision based on
knowledge of a desired and likely outcome.
The seventeenth wandering of
American statesmanship was Truman’s immoral order to drop the atomic bomb on
the Japanese. Not only had Japan been
repeatedly suing for peace but it was the act of unparalleled brutality in all
American history. It will forever weigh
heavily on the American conscience.
Hoover finally makes an unequivocal statement about “Truman’s
immoral order.” Again it should be noted
that this is to be found in the appendix of the book, placed in this volume by
the editor. Hoover does not use such
strong language regarding Truman in his intended volumes, those being cleaned
up by his own direction to his assistant.
In this statement, Hoover is only wrong on the prediction that this
decision will “forever weigh heavily on the American conscience.” Immediately after the war, many worked
overtime to develop the myth of the atomic bombs, despite numerous reports by
leaders – both civilian and military – that said this action was not necessary
to end the war.
The eighteenth failure was in respect to China, where first
Roosevelt, then Truman encouraged Chiang Kai-shek to incorporate communists
into his government. Of course, the fate
of China was in any case lost once America made alliance with the Russians.
The nineteenth failure Hoover identifies is the sowing of a
third world war “sown in every corner of the world.” The “cold war” as he calls it, first
manifesting in Korea.
It is not appropriate to call nineteen such significant
failures simply mistakes, or blunders, as Hoover continually does. Each of these decisions and actions had
significant impact and consequence on the world stage, affecting the lives of
hundreds of millions if not billions of people.
Two or three missteps in a time of crisis might be understandable. Hoover lists a string of nineteen major
failures – and nowhere in this book does he identify any such list of policies
pursued or actions taken that would purposely and deliberately lead to peace,
or a sooner end to the war. There is no
corresponding list of diplomatic “successes.”
Such continual blunders do not happen by mistake at the
highest levels of diplomacy and statesmanship by men of the highest capability
in this art. It is far more believable
to accept the explanation that the actions taken were by design, with knowledge
of the likely outcomes, and with alternatives developed in case of
failure. In addressing the actions
leading up to Pearl Harbor, George Victor, a Roosevelt admirer, offers a
similar sentiment:
Events are poorly explained by
making assumptions that crucial acts by competent, conscientious leaders were
capricious, careless, or negligent. And U.S. leaders who figured in the Pearl
Harbor disaster were highly competent and conscientious.
After Roosevelt stationed the fleet
at Pearl Harbor, Commander McCollum wrote a memo for him, recommending its use
as a lure. Roosevelt implemented the recommendation. Admiral Richardson
concluded the administration use of the fleet endangered it gravely, and he
argued the point over and over with his superiors. When he took measures to
protect his fleet, Roosevelt relieved him. Stark then kept Kimmel uninformed of
Japan’s plans to attack it at Pearl Harbor. And Marshall kept Short uninformed.
To most Americans, manipulating
one’s nation into war is something done by foreign tyrants – not our own
leaders. Since 1942 U.S. history has been distorted by the idea that presidents
simply do not do what Roosevelt’s enemies said he did.
What Hoover sees as the nineteenth failure I regard as the
ultimate success – success for those who put this entire plan in motion. The first eighteen “failures,” as Hoover
calls them, can all be viewed as successes if a perpetual cold war was the
objective. It is a fine objective if
aggrandizement of the state is desired; if centralization is the goal; if
actions toward one-world government are in the sights of the leaders. All of these were outcomes after this
war. It is foolish to dismiss that these
might also have been the objective of the war.
Nineteen “mistakes” and “blunders” leading to these results don’t just
“happen.”
However, I think the story goes even deeper. It is interesting that the totalitarian model
of the state took hold in many parts of the world at approximately the same
time – during the 1920s and 1930s.
Russian Communism, along with German and Italian Fascism, all arose out
of the ashes of the Great War. Further,
from an economic standpoint, it must be recognized that the programs Roosevelt
put in place during the 1930s were different only in degrees from the state
actions taken in Europe.
Was there a plan to turn much of the industrialized world
into a centrally planned, command and control economy, or were these
conversions merely coincidence? Such
significant and simultaneous changes do not happen by accident, I believe. Many of the world’s economies abandoned
silver as money during the late 1800s, and moved toward central banking by the
early 1900s, this reducing and eventually eliminating the role of gold as
money. Money was taken from the hands of
the market and placed into the hands of the planners.
Roosevelt was elected to implement this totalitarian
economic plan in the United States. In
fact, the first of the nineteen failures was when Roosevelt toppled the
agreement already in place to return to an international gold standard, one
that would have helped to mitigate the various global financial
imbalances. Hoover claims Roosevelt’s
economic failures as the first reason why Roosevelt wanted war – in order to
change the subject, if you will.
I think Hoover is correct, but not for the reasons he
claims. Roosevelt’s economic plan did
fail – not the plan to revive the American economy, but the plan to model and
mold it into a successful totalitarian system.
While we look back at Roosevelt’s policies as revolutionary in the
American context (which they certainly were), they did not achieve the level of
sustainable control that was seen in other parts of the world. Roosevelt regularly met with failures: in the
length of the depression, in occasional push-back from the legislature and the
courts, and mostly from an American spirit that was much closer to the idea of
economic freedom than from those who populated the “successfully” centralized
states of Europe.
Despite the relative progress he made, Roosevelt failed in his
economic task of effective centralization.
Therefore he was tasked to get the country into a war that would build
up one of the other centralizing powers, and naturally further centralize the
United States. The spread of
totalitarian control by the oligarchs is not confined to borders or
ideologies. For various reasons, the
proper choice was Stalin and the Russians as opposed to Hitler and the
Germans. For instance, Communism was
exportable, while National Socialism was…national. The objective was to build up a perpetual
enemy, one that would allow for further government control and further
world-wide centralization. War is the
health of the state, and perpetual global war allows for the healthiest state.
Every one of the nineteen “failures” identified by Hoover can
be viewed as successes if the objective of spreading totalitarianism and
centralization is kept in view. Re-read
the list with this in mind. While not an
iron-clad certainty, the pattern fits the conclusion.
Had Roosevelt stayed out of the conflict, the two great
European totalitarian powers would have so weakened themselves, that the door
would have reopened for the possibility of a liberalized west. America would have remained the beacon that
Hoover regularly suggested it would and should be by staying out of the
European conflict. For all of its
faults, the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the predecessors to modern Germany
offered some of the most liberal possibilities for people in the West (for
example, the ample benefits afforded due to a common language across multiple
political jurisdictions). Instead of
staying out of the conflict and allowing the two European powers to destroy
each other and leaving the United States as a free beacon for the world,
Roosevelt chose to take sides.
Therefore, one can see step by step – beginning with
Roosevelt’s about face on the London conference in 1933 that would have brought
gold back into the global economic landscape – that these blunders were not
blunders at all, but deliberate steps taken by men desirous of ushering in a
great leap forward in totalitarianism.
If this totalitarianism could not be achieved in America through the
front door, the back door via global war and ultimately perpetual war was not
too high a price to pay for those oligarchs in positions of control.