tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-648884752216444797.post7157731978246504362..comments2024-03-28T06:00:18.802-07:00Comments on bionic mosquito: A Return to Proportionalitybionic mosquitohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12002548958078731031noreply@blogger.comBlogger6125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-648884752216444797.post-62673252216865332832014-07-05T09:58:58.675-07:002014-07-05T09:58:58.675-07:00There is a subjective point at which punishment ma...There is a subjective point at which punishment may become a NAP violation in itself, restitution by it's nature doesn't have that problem.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-648884752216444797.post-78632612546649026812014-07-05T04:37:46.563-07:002014-07-05T04:37:46.563-07:00In a free society why is there an obligation for r...In a free society why is there an obligation for restitution at all? People should be to do as they think is right and the market sorts it out. Namely most people may prefer punishment first and foremost.Gilnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-648884752216444797.post-77004175434008476422014-07-04T15:20:56.130-07:002014-07-04T15:20:56.130-07:00"Dead end." I see what you did there. ..."Dead end." I see what you did there. ;-)gpondhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01013837189187920036noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-648884752216444797.post-87546436837662281092014-07-04T08:30:15.166-07:002014-07-04T08:30:15.166-07:00As mentioned, your comments helped me think throug...As mentioned, your comments helped me think through this.<br /><br />Thank you for the further references to Rothbard; I think it is time for me to read him on this subject, as I think I have gone about as far as I can on my own.bionic mosquitohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12002548958078731031noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-648884752216444797.post-53094697559900352622014-07-04T07:54:43.841-07:002014-07-04T07:54:43.841-07:00I'm flattered that you'd mention me in one...I'm flattered that you'd mention me in one of your blog posts. :)<br /><br />I've been thinking more about what the <i>lex talionis</i> calls for in the case of theft. If you steal an ounce of gold from me, and I take it back from you later, you haven't lost any rights with respect to me, while I lost rights with respect to you (namely, the ownership rights of the ounce of gold). This does not seem to satisfy the <i>lex talionis</i> after all. What does seem to satisfy it is if I then gain ownership rights to an ounce of gold of yours. When one unjustly deprives another of rights, he loses those same rights for himself.<br /><br />This seems to be the basis for Rothbard's contention in <i>The Ethics of Liberty</i> that the restitution for theft is double what was stolen. From <a href="http://mises.org/rothbard/ethics/thirteen.asp" rel="nofollow">here</a>:<br /><br /><i>"But how are we to gauge the nature of the extent? Let us return to the theft of the $15,000. Even here, simple restitution of the $15,000 is scarcely sufficient to cover the crime (even if we add damages, costs, interest, etc.). For one thing, mere loss of the money stolen obviously fails to function in any sense as a deterrent to future such crime (although we will see below that deterrence itself is a faulty criterion for gauging punishment). If, then, we are to say that the criminal loses rights </i>to the extent that he deprives the victim,<i> then we must say that the criminal should not only have to return the $15,000, but that he must be forced to pay the victim </i>another<i> $15,000, so that he, in turn, loses those rights (to $15,000 worth of property) which he had taken from the victim. In the case of theft, then, we may say that the criminal must pay double the extent of theft: once, for restitution of the amount stolen, and once again for loss of what he had deprived another.[6] [Italics in original.]"</i><br /><br />However, I personally wouldn't say that restitution is double in the case of theft, if only because I make a distinction between "restitution" ("what is necessary to make a victim whole") and "retaliation" ("like for like"). So in Rothbard's example, I'd consider the first $15,000 (likely more, due to interest, court costs, etc.) to be restitution, while I'd consider the second $15,000 to be retaliation. This may just be an issue of semantics, but I do consider semantics to be very important.<br /><br />Rothbard also makes a point in <a href="https://mises.org/rothbard/lawproperty.pdf" rel="nofollow">here</a> about defense versus punishment. He considers shooting a person engaged in the act of shoplifting to be an instance of the former, not the latter. I'm not yet sure where I stand on this.Autolykosnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-648884752216444797.post-57879576610929653752014-07-04T05:01:31.727-07:002014-07-04T05:01:31.727-07:00For whatever it is worth, there's some interes...For whatever it is worth, there's some interesting commentary in RW's follow up post on the topic here as well:<br /><br />http://www.economicpolicyjournal.com/2014/06/a-further-comment-on-types-of-response.htmlNick Badalamentihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14015961786370759940noreply@blogger.com